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When disasters are impending, public officials and hospital administrators must 
determine whether to evacuate or shelter-in-place hospitals. During recent hurricanes, 
hospitals have proven unable to sustain continuity of operations. While failure to 
preemptively evacuate can endanger the safety of patients and staff, evacuation is not 
without risk and should only be undertaken if warranted. Little is known about how 
evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making for hospitals occurs in practice. This 
research examined evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making for hospitals in 
Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York during Hurricane Sandy in 2012. State 
emergency preparedness laws that may have affected evacuation and shelter-in-place of 
hospitals were systematically identified and analyzed. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with key informants who were responsible for decision-making during Sandy. 
Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and thematically analyzed. At the time of Sandy, 
none of these states had enacted statutes or regulations explicitly granting the government 
the authority to order shelter-in-place of hospitals. While all four states had enacted laws 
explicitly enabling the government to order evacuation, the nature of this authority and 
the individuals empowered to execute it varied. Hospital executives reported having 
authority and responsibility for decision-making. In New York and Maryland, 
government officials stated they could order hospital evacuation whereas officials in 
Delaware and New Jersey said the government lacked enforcement capacity and 
therefore could not mandate evacuation. Key informants relied on their instincts and did 
not employ aids or tools to make evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions during Sandy. 
Risk to patient health from evacuation, prior experience, cost, and ability to maintain 
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continuity of operations were the most influential factors in decision-making. Flooding 
and utility outages were the primary determinants of evacuation. States can further 
improve their readiness for catastrophic disasters by ensuring explicit authority to order 
evacuation and shelter-in-place where it does not already exist. Governmental and 
hospital plans should explicitly delineate decision-making processes and include explicit 
thresholds that, if exceeded, would trigger evacuation. Comparative risk assessments that 
inform decision-making would be enhanced by improved collection, analysis, and 
communication of data on morbidity and mortality associated with both pre- and post-
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Recently, there has been growing recognition that global climate change is occurring and 
that the severity of natural disasters has and will continue to increase as a consequence. 
According to the United States Global Change Research Program, “Even without further 
coastal development, storm surge levels and hurricane damages are likely to increase 
because of increasing hurricane intensity coupled with sea-level rise, the latter being a 
virtually certain outcome of the warming global climate” (Karl, Melillo, & Peterson, 
20009). As a result of the flooding of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 1% 
of the exposed population died, a rate that is no better than average event mortalities for 
historic floods (Jonkman, Maaskant, Boyd, & Levitan, 2009). There is an urgent need to 
adapt and respond to the challenges climate change poses in order to protect public health. 
 
When natural disasters such as hurricanes strike, public officials and hospital 
administrators are faced with complex decisions to ensure the public’s health and safety. 
A common, crucial decision is whether to evacuate healthcare facilities or whether to 
have patients and staff “shelter-in-place” (i.e., to remain within the healthcare facility for 
the duration of the emergency). During recent disasters, most notably Hurricane Katrina, 
hospitals and other healthcare facilities have proven unable to sustain continuity of 
operations and patient care while sheltering-in-place (Gray & Herbert, 2006). Moreover, 
failure to preemptively evacuate has endangered the safety of patients and staff. However, 
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evacuation is not without its own risk. Although data for hospitals does not exist, research 
has found that evacuation, and not the hurricane itself, significantly increases rates of 
mortality, morbidity, and hospitalization among nursing home patients (Dosa et al., 2010). 
Consequently, experts advise against policies of universal evacuation of healthcare 
facilities when there are impending storms (Dosa et al., 2012). Thus, as a storm is 
approaching, public health leaders and healthcare administrators must weigh the risks of 




On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall in New Jersey, devastating the 
Mid-Atlantic region’s healthcare system, particularly hospitals. While several hospitals 
evacuated prior to the storm’s arrival, other hospitals with seemingly similar risk profiles 
opted to shelter-in-place only to have to undertake urgent evacuations after critical 
infrastructure was damaged. Due to a 14-foot storm surge, fuel pumps supplying backup 
generators at New York University Langone Medical Center were damaged, necessitating 
the urgent evacuation of 322 patients – including 21 infants from the hospital’s Neonatal 
Intensive Care Unit – overnight during the storm (Espiritu et al., 2014; VanDevanter, 
Kovner, Raveis, McCollum, & Keller, 2014). A short while later, nearby Bellevue 
Medical Center was evacuated for the first time in its 275-year history (Ofri, 2012; Uppal 
et al., 2013). In contrast, the Veterans Administration New York Harbor Healthcare 
System’s Manhattan Campus, which neighbors these facilities, had evacuated 
preemptively, thus avoiding the need for any emergency evacuation during the storm. 
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The perilous evacuation of these two major medical institutions, in contrast to their 
neighbor, raised questions about how evacuation and shelter-in-place was decided upon 
and why government officials had not mandated hospital evacuation, as they had done 
one year prior in anticipation of Hurricane Irene in August 2011. U.S. hospitals are 
required to have all-hazards emergency plans, which may include procedures for 
evacuating patients (The Joint Commission, 2012; 42 CFR 482.41). Although guidance 
exists to facilitate evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making, little is known about 
how decision-making occurs in practice.  
 
Conceptual Model for Understanding Evacuation of Healthcare Facilities  
 
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Dobalian et al. (2010) developed a conceptual model 
to study future healthcare facility evacuations and specifically to understand decision-
making processes of facility administrators (Figure 1). This conceptual model provided 
the context in which to examine decision-making and its influence on evacuation and 




The goal of this research was to enable public health, healthcare, and emergency 
management practitioners to respond to the near-term threats of climate change and to 
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protect public health by improving evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making for 
hospitals. 
Specific Aims and Research Questions 
 
The study area of this research consisted of four contiguous states within the Mid-
Atlantic region
*
 of the United States – Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York 




The specific aims of this research study were to:   
 
Specific Aim 1 – Characterize the region’s public health legal preparedness at the time of 
Hurricane Sandy by identifying and comparing emergency authorities and 
responsibilities of Mid-Atlantic state governments. 
 
Research Question 1.1: Within the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States, which 
organizations and individuals had authority and responsibility to issue emergency and 
public health emergency declarations and what did these authorities entail? 
 
                                                             
*
 Federal agencies involved in public health and emergency response include different states in their 
definitions of the “Mid-Atlantic” Region
 
(Table 1). For the purpose of this research, Mid-Atlantic States are 
defined as states located in the middle of the Eastern Seaboard (i.e., the east coast) of the United States off 
of the Atlantic Ocean. 
†
 Hurricane Sandy was nicknamed and popularly known as “Superstorm Sandy” because of its considerable 
size. Although Sandy weakened from a Category 3 hurricane (on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind 
Scale) in the Caribbean to an intense post-tropical cyclone before landfall in the United States, to avoid 
confusion, it is referred to as Hurricane Sandy throughout this dissertation. 
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Research Question 1.2: Within the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States, which 
organizations and individuals had authority and responsibility to order evacuations and 
what did that authority entail? 
 
Research Question 1.3 Within the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States, which 
organizations and individuals had authority and responsibility to order shelter-in-place 
and what did that authority entail? 
 
Specific Aim 2 – Characterize key stakeholders’ perceptions of authority and 
responsibility for evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making for hospitals during 
Hurricane Sandy. 
 
Research Question 2.1: Who had authority to make evacuation and shelter-in-place 
decisions for hospitals in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States during Hurricane 
Sandy? 
 
Research Question 2.2: Who was responsible for making evacuation and shelter-in-place 
decisions for hospitals in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States during Hurricane 
Sandy? 
 
Specific Aim 3 – Describe the nature of hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place 




Research Question 3.1: What legal and decision-making processes did government 
officials and hospital executives in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States employ to 
make decisions about evacuating or sheltering-in-place hospitals during Hurricane 
Sandy? 
 
Research Question 3.2: What data, resources, or aids informed these decisions? 
 
Research Questions 3.3: How can evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making for 




Background and Literature Review 
Hurricanes  
 
A tropical cyclone is an organized system of clouds and thunderstorms with a closed 
circulation around a low atmospheric pressure center that originates over tropical or 
subtropical waters (Rosential, n.d.). Hurricanes
‡
 are defined as tropical cyclones with 
maximum sustained 1-minute surface winds of 74 miles per hour (mph) or greater (Table 
2) (Goldenberg, n.d.). Atlantic Hurricanes are a subset of hurricanes that form in the 
North Atlantic Basin, which includes the North Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and the 
Gulf of Mexico (Table 3) (NWS, n.d.c). Ninety-seven percent of tropical activity in the 
Atlantic Basin occurs in “Atlantic Hurricane Season,” which runs between 1 June and 30 
November (AOML, n.d.). On average between 1970 and 2010, there were 11 annual 
tropical storms originating in the Atlantic Basin, 6 of which became Atlantic Hurricanes 
(DOC, 2013).  
 
The National Hurricane Center uses the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, a scale of 
hurricane intensity ranging from 1 (least severe) to 5 (most severe), to warn the public of 
potential property damage from a hurricane, as well as to inform emergency management 
decisions such as evacuation (Table 4) (The Associated Press, 2007). Over a typical 2-
year period, the U.S. coastlines are collectively struck by an average of 3 hurricanes, 1 of 
                                                             
‡
 Tropical cyclones are referred to by different names depending on where they occur in the world. Storms 
that occur in the Indian Ocean are referred to simply as cyclones. Tropical cyclones that occur north of the 
Equator and west of the International Dateline (i.e., in the Western Pacific Ocean) are referred to as 
typhoons, while Northern Hemisphere tropical cyclones that occur east of the International Dateline to the 
Greenwich Meridian (i.e., Atlantic and Eastern Pacific Oceans) are termed hurricanes (Table 3). 
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which is classified as a Category 3, 4 or 5 hurricane (DOC, 2013).
§
 Between 1900 and 
2010, the costliest tropical cyclone on record to strike the U.S. mainland was Category 3 
Hurricane Katrina (2005), which was responsible for $105.8 million US Dollars (USD) of 
property damage, followed by Category 5 Hurricane Andrew (1992), which resulted in 
$45.6 million USD in damage, and Category 2 Hurricane Ike (2008), which resulted in 
$27.8 million USD in damage. Even after accounting for inflation, eleven of the thirty 
costliest hurricanes on record have occurred between 2000 and 2010. After normalizing 
for societal vulnerability today (e.g., population and property development), eight of the 





 Between 1851 and 2010, the three deadliest tropical cyclones in the 
U.S. were the Galveston Hurricane of 1900 (Category 4), Florida/Lake Okeechobee 





 and 1200 deaths respectively (Blake et al., 2011).   
 
Hazards associated with tropical cyclones include high winds, heavy rainfall, storm surge, 
inland flooding, tornadoes, and rip currents (NWS, n.d.a). Hurricanes and these 
environmental hazards can result in public health harms such as drowning, electrocution, 
carbon monoxide poisoning, heat-related illness, food and water-borne illness, 
musculoskeletal injuries, insect and animal bites, and mold exposure. 
                                                             
§
 A Category 3, 4, or 5 on the Saffir-Simpson Scale is also referred to as a “major” hurricane. 
**
 Beginning in 1995, these costs include adjusted National Flood Insurance Program flood damage 
amounts. These costs have been adjusted for 2010 Dollars on the basis of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce Implicit Price Deflator for Construction.  
††
 This only includes data from 1900-2010. No estimates of the financial burden of hurricanes are available 
prior to 1900. Data after 2010 have not yet been analyzed and/or published. 
‡‡
 Could be as high at 12,000 deaths.   
§§
 Could be as high as 3,000 deaths. 
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Sheltering and Evacuation Hazards 
 
When hurricanes are impending, state and local public officials are faced with the 
difficult decision of whether to order evacuation. Even more complicated than evacuating 
the general public is the decision of whether to evacuate the vulnerable population of 
hospitalized patients or whether to have those patients and the providers who care for 
them “shelter-in-place” (i.e., remain in the hospital for the duration of the emergency). 
Hospitalized patients, unlike the general public, cannot self-evacuate. Moreover, they rely 
on public officials and hospital administrators not only to ensure their safety but also to 
ensure continuation of their medical care regardless of whether they shelter-in-place or 
evacuate. 
 
When a decision to shelter-in-place is made, failure to ensure continuity of essential 
services can put both patients and workers at risk. Anecdotal reports from Hurricane 
Katrina revealed that some hospitals which sheltered-in-place lost electricity and, in turn, 
functions that required power including: lights, elevators, air conditioning, running water 
(and the sanitation of lavatories), and communications, as well as clinical functions 
(Kline, 2007). At the Medical Center on Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi, Mississippi, 
facility emergency generators were destroyed by storm surge, forcing staff to perform a 
cesarean delivery using battery-operated flashlights to illuminate the operative field and a 
small generator, which was borrowed from a critically ill patient who had to be manually 
ventilated during the entire cesarean delivery (Allen, Flinn, & Moore, 2007). Similarly, 
loss of power at Charity Hospital in New Orleans resulted in the application of altered 
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standards of care for critically ill patients. This included the inability to obtain head scans 
of a patient who had a serious brain injury, no laboratory services, and the need to cool 
patients with Styrofoam cafeteria trays due to lack of air conditioning and a shortage of 
fans. In addition to resulting in altered – and potentially unacceptable – levels of care, 
lack of power also placed workers at risk of injury. The inability to use elevators forced 
staff to carry patients and equipment up and down stairs. One patient was carried down 
seven flights of stairs on an exterior fire escape to be evacuated. A generator was “hauled 
up seven floors by a large group of men…since the generator was large and quite heavy, 
this required a herculean effort on the part of all involved [and] of course the effort had to 
be repeated with other generators” (Kline, 2007). At Tulane Hospital, staff had to move 
bedbound patients down unlit stairways; two patients were on left ventricular assist 
devices, which could not be moved more than 2 feet from the patient and weighed 500 
pounds. Tulane staff not only had to perform tasks with which they were unfamiliar but 
also had to lift and move significant weight in an unfavorable environment (e.g., 
temperatures significantly above 79 Fahrenheit and minimal lighting) (McSwain, 2010).  
 
In light of the conditions that emerged in facilities that did not evacuate in anticipation of 
Hurricane Katrina, healthcare facility administrators have since reported feeling pressure 
to evacuate all at-risk facilities prior to hurricane landfall (Dosa et al., 2012). Although 
evacuation may be necessary to ensure adequate standards of care for patients, as well as 
to protect patients and workers, evacuation is not without risk. It can disrupt delicate 
social conditions, separating fragile patients from familiar settings, usual care-providers, 
and regular medication administration. While unwarranted evacuation can be a nuisance 
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for ordinary citizens, it can be harmful – and even life threatening – to vulnerable 
populations such as the elderly, disabled, and mentally ill. Although limited evidence 
exists for hospital populations, a study of nursing home residents with dementia 
discovered that patients who were evacuated were at increased risk of death even 30 and 
90 days after relocation (Brown, 2012).  
 
In 2011, in anticipation of Hurricane Irene, many healthcare facilities in the Mid-Atlantic 
region evacuated. In New York City alone, at least 7,000 patients were evacuated from 
hospitals and chronic care facilities in low-lying areas (Farley, 2013). Ultimately, Irene 
did not impact the Mid-Atlantic region as anticipated. According to the testimony of New 
York City Health Commissioner Thomas Farley, “in retrospect these evacuations were 
unnecessary” (Farley 2013). Moreover, many healthcare facility administrators reported 
that they believed evacuation adversely impacted their patients (Farley, 2013). Given the 
risk evacuation poses, universal evacuations of healthcare facilities are not advised (Dosa, 
2012). Thus, the likelihood of the storm and the risks associated with evacuation must be 
carefully weighed against the risk of sheltering in-place in the hospital for the duration of 
the emergency.  
 
Emergency Planning Requirements 
 
As a condition of participation in Medicare, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS) require that hospitals are “constructed, arranged, and maintained to 




Hospitals that seek to be compensated under Medicare must have 
“emergency power and lighting in at least the operating, recovery, intensive care, and 
emergency rooms, and stairwells. In all other areas not serviced by the emergency supply 
source, battery lamps and flashlights must be available” (42 CFR 482.21, 2011).
 
State 
survey agencies routinely visit hospitals to determine compliance with these and other 
Medicare conditions of participation. Participating hospitals must also comply with the 
Life Safety Code of the National Fire Protection Association (2000), which requires 
written emergency plans for fire and evacuation.  
 
Alternatively, hospitals can be exempt from these state surveys and can be deemed in 
compliance with Medicare conditions of participation if they achieve accreditation 
through one of the national accrediting organizations (CMS, 2015). At the time of 
Hurricane Sandy, there were three CMS-approved national accrediting organizations: 
Joint Commission, Det Norske Veritas Healthcare, Inc., and Healthcare Facilities 
Accreditation Program (CMS, n.d.).
***
 The Joint Commission
†††
, the largest healthcare 
accrediting organization, requires hospitals to develop and maintain an Emergency 
Operations Plan (EOP) that describes response procedures, which could include 
evacuation (The Joint Commission, 2012). As a result of these conditions of participation 
and accreditation requirements, hospital emergency plans often focus on internal 
emergencies such as fires. Additionally, such plans typically address the logistics of 
                                                             
***
 Since Hurricane Sandy, the Center for Improvement in Healthcare Quality (CIHQ) was also approved as 
a national accrediting organization (CMS, 2013). 
†††
 Formerly known as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. 
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evacuation (i.e., evacuation procedures) and not how decision-makers can or should 





On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall in Brigantine, New Jersey, 
ravaging the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States. Hurricane Sandy was the second 
costliest cyclone in U.S. record-keeping history and the largest named storm on record in 
the Atlantic Ocean. Of the 147 deaths directly attributed to Hurricane Sandy, nearly half 
occurred in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern U.S. (Blake, Kimberlain, Cangialosi, & 
Beven, 2013). In addition to resulting in direct mortality, Hurricane Sandy had 
devastating impacts on the Mid-Atlantic region’s healthcare systems, particularly 
hospitals (The City of New York, 2013; OIG, 2014).  
 
In New York City alone, to ensure safety and continuity of medical care, approximately 
6,300 patients were evacuated from 37 healthcare facilities (Farley, 2013). There were a 
total of 8 full-scale acute care hospital evacuations related to Hurricane Sandy.
‡‡‡
 Two 
acute care hospitals evacuated in New Jersey – one prior to Sandy’s landfall in Hudson 
County and one during the storm in Bergen County (Washburn, 2014). In New York 
State, one evacuation took place in Long Beach, Long Island while the remaining 5 
evacuations took place in New York City (4 in Manhattan and 1 in Brooklyn) (The City 
                                                             
‡‡‡
 In Staten Island, New York there was also a psychiatric hospital, South Beach Psychiatric Center, which 
evacuated prior to Hurricane Sandy (NYS OMH & NYS DOH, 2013). 
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of Long Beach, n.d.).
 
Three of the New York acute care hospital evacuations were 
preemptive. The remainder occurred during or in the immediate aftermath of (up to 2 
days after) Sandy’s landfall (Adalja et al., 2014).  
 
Evacuation Decision Making 
 
In Hurricane Sandy’s aftermath, researchers and news media questioned why hospitals 
that were in close proximity to one another and had ostensibly similar risk profiles made 
differing decisions about evacuation and shelter-in-place (Hartocollis & Bernstein, 2012). 
There was also lingering uncertainty about why New York government officials had not 
ordered evacuation of hospitals in low-lying areas as they had in anticipation of 
Hurricane Irene in 2011 (Fink, 2012). Commentators called for “clear and consistent 
criteria to guide evacuation decisions,” as well as integrated local and regional decision-
making for sentinel events” (Hanfling, Powell, & Gostin, 2013; Powell, Hanfling & 
Gostin, 2012). 
 
In response to similar calls after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services funded the development of tools and aids
§§§
 to support 
hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making (Zane et al., 2010). In addition 
to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Hospital Evacuation Decision Guide, 
numerous state resources were also developed post-Katrina (California Hospital 
                                                             
§§§
 Aids refer to devices used to assist in the deliberative process of decision-making. Aids facilitate 
decision-making by helping decision-makers think about the situation, their options – including the option 
to do nothing – as well as the risks and benefits of each option. Examples of decision aids include 
checklists and decision trees. 
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Association, 2010; HSPH-EPREP, 2012). After Hurricane Sandy, Hassol et al. (2013) 
noted, “The most senior administrators of each hospital should be familiar with the data 
and plans upon which an evacuation decision would be based and use the best available 
guides for decision making, before and after an evacuation.”
 
Given the existence of these 
decision-making resources, as well as CMS and national accrediting organization 
emergency planning requirements, questions arise about whether decision-makers during 
Sandy were familiar with and employed these tools, as well as whether these resources 
are effective. It is also unknown whether and if so, how hospital administrators are 
considering the health and safety of their employees in their decision processes. Guidance 
for considering employee health and safety is limited; an Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration toolkit, the Hurricane eMatrix, focuses only on hazard exposure and risk 
assessment for response and recovery workers – not healthcare facility employees 
(OSHA, n.d.).  
 
Existing peer-reviewed literature on hospital evacuations is limited (Bagaria, Heggie, 
Abrahams & Murray, 2009). Many publications are anecdotal and relay the experiences 
of practitioners and patients in healthcare facilities that evacuated (Kline, 2007; Ofri, 
2012). With a few exceptions (McSwain, 2010; Verni, 2012),
 
the majority of studies have 
considered the experience of single healthcare facilities (Blaser & Ellison, 1985; Uppal et 
al., 2013), units within hospitals (Espiritu et al., 2014; King et al., 2015), or even 
individual patients (Ramme, Vira & McLaurin, 2015). Other research has focused on the 
experiences of receiving hospital facilities or of staff who were evacuated and then re-
assigned to these receiving hospitals (Adalja et al., 2014; VanDevanter et al., 2014). 
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Although this body of literature contains many lessons regarding preparedness and 
logistics of evacuation, it contains little information about how evacuation and shelter-in-
place decisions for hospitals are made in practice (Bagaria et al., 2009).  
 
McGlown (2001) identified variables health care executives considered critical in the 
decision to evacuate a healthcare facility. Though this research provided important 
insight, it did not include public health practitioners who play a key role in evacuation 
decision-making for healthcare facilities. Additionally, McGlown’s research did not 
pertain to a specific emergency or decision that had taken place (i.e., it did not examine 
what factors were considered in practice during a specific disaster).  
 
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, Dobalian, Claver and Fickel (2010) developed 
a conceptual model to study future healthcare facility evacuations and specifically to 
understand decision-making processes of facility administrators (Figure 1). A few studies 
have examined evacuation decision-making for hospitals during recent Hurricanes. 
Downey, Andress and Schultz (2013b) examined decision-making for 7 acute care 
hospitals within a single healthcare system that evacuated during Hurricane Rita in 2005. 
They identified the issuance of mandatory evacuation orders, storm characteristics (wind 
speed, storm surge, and projected path) and loss of regional communications as the most 
influential factors prompting evacuation (Downey, Andress & Shultz, 2013a).
 
Ricci, 
Griffin, Heslin, Kranke, and Dobalian (2015) examined hospital evacuation and shelter-
in-place decision-making processes during Hurricane Sandy, but the generalizability of 
this research is limited as it considers a single federal hospital facility. There remains a 
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lack of information on decision-making processes (i.e., how information is gathered, 
weighed, and acted upon), particularly when evacuation must be decided upon for 







To assess the public health legal preparedness of the Mid-Atlantic region, state 
emergency preparedness laws that may have affected evacuation and shelter-in-place of 
hospitals during Hurricane Sandy in 2012 were systematically identified and analyzed. 
Within the Mid-Atlantic region of the U.S., organizations or individuals who had legal 
authority to declare an emergency, declare a public health emergency, and order 
evacuation or shelter-in-place during Hurricane Sandy were identified. The nature of 
these authorities was subsequently described and analyzed. 
 
Aim 1 Data Collection 
 
Consistent with established public health legal research methods, emergency 
preparedness laws in four contiguous Mid-Atlantic states were systematically analyzed 
(Wagenaar & Burris, 2013). These state-level laws concerned each government’s 
authority to: (1) declare an emergency, (2) declare a health emergency, and (3) order 
evacuation or shelter-in-place. Utilizing an electronic legal database, LexisNexis
®
 State 
Capital (Bethesda, MD, USA), Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York 
statutory and administrative codes were searched to identify emergency preparedness 
laws in place on October 22, 2012, the date on which Sandy became a named storm 
(Blake, 2013). Initial keywords, which were based on a priori knowledge, included: 
“emergency,” “disaster,” “public health emergency,” “health emergency,” “evacuation,” 
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“shelter,” and “sheltering-in-place.” These keywords were piloted and refined through an 
iterative process including review of preliminary findings by myself and members of my 
thesis advisor committee. After piloting and finalizing search terms, three distinct queries 
were then conducted of the Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York statutory 
and administrative codes for each of the authorities of interest. The final search strings 
were:  
 
(1) Authority to declare an emergency: “disaster” OR “emergency” AND “governor” 
(2) Authority to declare a health emergency: “health emergency” OR “health disaster”  
(3) Authority to order evacuation or shelter-in-place: “shelter” OR “evacuate” 
 
The full text of every state statute and regulation returned by each query was 
subsequently reviewed and duplicates were removed (Table 5). The following exclusion 
criteria were applied to the identified laws:  
 
(1) Executive orders, which are codified in some states, were excluded because they 
themselves do not confer authority but rather are examples of the exercise of 
authority granted by statute or regulation;  
(2) Laws in which the keyword had a meaning unrelated to health emergency 
preparedness were excluded (e.g., bus shelters);  
(3) Laws pertaining to the evacuation of vehicles (e.g., trains) or rides (e.g., fun houses) 
were excluded;  
(4) Laws addressing only fire-related evacuation were excluded;  
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(5) Laws addressing only casino emergencies were excluded. 
As a quality control measure, the identified laws were compared to existing, publically 
available lists of emergency health laws from the Network for Public Health Law and the 
Johns Hopkins Center for Law and the Public’s Health (NPHL, 2012) (Center for Law 
and the Public’s Health, 2013).
 
When a discrepancy arose between search findings and 
existing compilations of emergency health laws, I consulted the law’s text to determine 
whether it should be included in the data set.  
 
Aim 1 Data Analysis 
 
Three electronic data extraction forms (one for each of the three searches) were created in 
Qualtrics (Provo, UT, U.S.), an online survey and data collection program. These forms 
were then used to abstract information from the full text of the statutes and regulations 
previously determined to be relevant for each of the authorities of interest. The 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officers (ASTHO) Emergency Declarations & 
Authorities–State Analysis Guide (2011), as well as the study’s aims and research 
questions, informed the development of the fields in each data extraction form. 
Abstracted data allowed for a comparison of the four states’ laws with respect to the three 
types of emergency authorities and an understanding of the legal context that existed in 
Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York at the time of Hurricane Sandy in 
October 2012.   
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The final materials included: a study protocol, which documents each step in the 
identification of laws and subsequent data abstraction; a list of all query results; the full 
text of all relevant laws; three data extraction forms; and an abstracted legal data set. To 
foster reliability of findings, the study protocol and data extraction forms are provided in 
Appendices 1-4 (Wood, 2012). 
 
Aims 2 and 3 
 
From March 2014 to February 2015, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key 
informants in Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York to examine acute care 
hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making during Hurricane Sandy.   
 
Selection and Recruitment of Participants  
 
News media stories, press releases, and governmental reports were reviewed to identify 
organizations for inclusion. Interviewees, who were selected based on their functional 
role, were purposively sampled to include at least one hospital representative per state 
and a public health and emergency management official from the hospital’s jurisdiction. 
Hospital interviewees were executives (e.g., chief executive officer (CEO)) or senior 
managers (e.g., director of emergency management). Governmental interviewees held 
senior leadership roles (e.g., commissioner/secretary of health, director of emergency 
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management) during Hurricane Sandy. Additional interviewees were added through 
snowball sampling. 
 
To be eligible for inclusion, during Hurricane Sandy, an interviewee must have been 
employed in Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, or New York, by either a(n): 1) hospital, 
2) health department, 3) office of emergency management, or 4) other organization, 
which was responsible for or significantly involved in the decision to shelter-in-place or 
evacuate hospitals during Hurricane Sandy. Hospitals were excluded if they never 
considered whether to evacuate, which was determined by asking the hospital itself. 
Potential interviewees were excluded if they lacked direct knowledge of decision-making. 
Each state’s hospital association – except for New York, where the trade association for 
the metropolitan New York area was contacted – validated hospitals for inclusion. 
Additionally, each state health department and the New York City Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene were consulted to ensure relevant hospitals were not omitted 
(Appendices 5 and 6).  
 
Aims 2 & 3 Data Collection 
 
A semi-structured interview guide was piloted with an emergency management official 
and revised based on feedback from pilot testing and several healthcare preparedness 
experts. The guide was organized into the following domains: authorities and 
responsibilities; decision processes; information and decision-making aids; and lessons 
learned (Appendix 7). Semi-structured interviews were conducted in-person or via phone 
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when an in-person meeting was not feasible. One health department opted for a facilitated 
group discussion. Interviewees were assigned a unique, random study identification 
number, which was used for all study materials. Interviews were audio-recorded and 
transcribed with the permission of interviewees (Appendix 8). Transcripts were compared 
to the audio recordings and any transcription errors were corrected.  
 
Aims 2 & 3 Data Analysis  
 
After each interview, a contact summary sheet was completed documenting immediate 
reflections (Appendix 9) (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014). To enhance analytic rigor 
and reliability, peer debriefing was conducted throughout data collection and analysis 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). An impartial peer with expertise in the subject matter and 
research methods, but no other role in the study, reviewed and critiqued data collection 
and analysis processes.  
 
A framework analytical approach was used to systematically search for patterns and 
generate descriptions for understanding the phenomenon of hospital evacuation and 
shelter-in-place decision-making (Gale, Heath, Cameron, Rashid & Redwood, 2013). 
Transcripts were thematically coded using QSR Nvivo for Mac v10.1.3 (Burlington, MA, 
U.S.). A codebook was developed with a priori codes based on research questions and 
conceptual models of healthcare facility evacuation decision-making from the peer-
reviewed literature (Dobalian et al., 2010; McGlown, 2001). Additional themes were 
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inductively identified and iteratively applied. Structural codes (e.g., state, informant’s 
sector, evacuation status) were applied to organize the data.  
 
The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review Board 
determined this study was not human subjects research and was therefore exempt from 












Manuscript 1: Hospital Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Decision-Making During 






Once thought to be bastions, hospitals have proven unable to ensure the safety of patients 
and staff and continuity of medical care during recent catastrophic disasters including 
Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. Given its duty to safeguard public health, the government 
has a responsibility to ensure appropriate protective action is taken when impending 
disasters threaten or impair the ability of hospitals to sustain essential services. The law 
enables the government to fulfill this duty by providing necessary authority to order 
preventive or reactive response when safety is imperiled. State emergency preparedness 
laws that may have affected evacuation and shelter-in-place of hospitals during Hurricane 
Sandy in 2012 were systematically identified and analyzed to understand public health 
legal preparedness of the Mid-Atlantic region. At the time of Hurricane Sandy, all four 
Mid-Atlantic states of interest had enacted laws empowering their governor to declare an 
emergency. However, these states were less consistent in enacting complementary laws 
including the authority to declare a health emergency, order evacuation, or order shelter-
in-place. Empirical analyses to enhance public health legal preparedness and ensure the 
Mid-Atlantic is better able to respond to future natural disasters like Hurricane Sandy, 








In 2012, Hurricane Sandy
****
 ravaged the Mid-Atlantic
††††
 region of the United States 
(U.S.). Hurricane Sandy was the biggest named storm on record in the Atlantic Ocean 
and the second – only to Hurricane Katrina – costliest cyclone in U.S. history (Blake, 
2013).  At least 148 deaths were directly attributed to Hurricane Sandy with nearly half of 
those fatalities occurring in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern U.S. (Blake, 2013). 
Besides resulting in direct mortality, Hurricane Sandy significantly threatened the health 
and safety of Mid-Atlantic residents. In New York City alone, to ensure their safety and 
continuity of medical care, approximately 6,300 patients were evacuated from 37 
healthcare facilities (Farley, 2013).  
 
During recent catastrophic hurricanes including Katrina in 2005 and Sandy in 2012, 
essential hospital services including power, steam, water, and sanitation were interrupted 
hindering both continuity of patient care and the safety of patients and staff. Because a 
fundamental duty of government is to protect the health and safety of its citizens, the 
government must ensure an appropriate response to natural disasters (Gostin, 2008). To 
cope with hurricane threats, such a response may necessitate sheltering-in-place
‡‡‡‡
 (i.e., 
                                                             
****
 Although Sandy evolved from a Category 3 hurricane in the Caribbean to an intense extratropical 
cyclone before landfall in the U.S., to avoid any confusion, it will be referred to as a hurricane throughout 
this chapter.   
††††
 For the purpose of this research, Mid-Atlantic states are defined as states located in the middle of the 
Eastern Seaboard (i.e., the east coast) of the United States off of the Atlantic Ocean. The study area of this 
research consisted of four contiguous states within this region – Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New 
York – that Hurricane Sandy was predicted to significantly impact. 
‡‡‡‡
 Shelter-in-place means “to take immediate shelter where you are – at home, work, school, or in 
between (CDC, n.d.).” This research focuses specifically on sheltering-in-place at a hospital.  
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taking refuge within a hospital) or evacuating
§§§§
 (i.e., the mass physical movement of 
patients and staff) hospitals. Public health legal preparedness plays an essential role in 
enabling the government to fulfill its duty by providing the necessary legal framework to 
respond to catastrophic disasters (Jacobson, Wasserman, Botoseneanu, Silverstein & Wu,  
2012; Moulton, Gottfried, Goodman, Murphy & Rawson, 2003). 
 
Public health legal preparedness is defined as the attainment by a public health system 
(e.g., a community, state, region, or nation) of legal benchmarks essential to the readiness 
of that system to respond to health threats. Scholars identify four core elements requisite 
to achieving public health legal preparedness: (1) laws or legal authorities; (2) 
competencies (i.e., abilities, skills) of those responsible for applying the law; (3) 
information to aid these individuals in applying the law; and (4) coordination across 
sectors and jurisdictions (Benjamin & Moulton, 2008; Moulton, 2003). This chapter 
examines the first core element – laws or legal authorities – to understand public health 
legal preparedness of the Mid-Atlantic region for catastrophic coastal storms such as 
Hurricane Sandy.  
 
State emergency preparedness laws that may have affected evacuation and shelter-in-
place of hospitals during Hurricane Sandy in 2012 were systematically identified and 
analyzed. Within the Mid-Atlantic region of the U.S., organizations or individuals who 
had legal authority to declare an emergency, declare a health emergency, and order 
                                                             
§§§§
 Evacuation is defined as “mass physical movements of people, of a temporary or permanent nature, that 
collectively emerge in coping with community threats, damages, or disruptions (Dobalian et al., 2010).”  
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evacuation or shelter-in-place during Hurricane Sandy were identified. The nature of 






Consistent with established public health law research methods, emergency preparedness 
laws in four contiguous Mid-Atlantic states were systematically analyzed (Wagenaar et 
al., 2013). These state-level laws concerned each government’s authority to: (1) declare 
an emergency, (2) declare a health emergency, and (3) order evacuation or shelter-in-
place. Utilizing an electronic legal database, LexisNexis
®
 State Capital (Bethesda, MD, 
USA), Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York statutory and administrative 
codes were searched to identify emergency preparedness laws in place on October 22, 
2012. Initial keywords, which were based on a priori knowledge, included: “emergency,” 
“disaster,” “public health emergency,” “health emergency,” “evacuation,” “shelter,” and 
“sheltering-in-place.” These keywords were piloted and refined through an iterative 
process including review of preliminary findings by the study team in order to create 
three separate keyword search strings corresponding to each of the three authorities of 
interest. Distinct queries were then conducted of the Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, 
and New York statutory and administrative codes for each of the authorities of interest 
using the following finalized keyword searches:  
(1) Authority to declare an emergency: “disaster” OR “emergency” AND “governor” 
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(2) Authority to declare a health emergency: “health emergency” OR “health disaster”  
(3) Authority to order evacuation or shelter-in-place: “shelter” OR “evacuate” 
 
The full text of every state statute and regulation returned by each query was 
subsequently reviewed and duplicates were removed (Table 5). The following exclusion 
criteria were applied to the identified laws:  
(1) Executive orders, which are codified in some states, were excluded because they 
themselves do not confer authority but rather are examples of the exercise of 
authority granted by statute or regulation;  
(2) Laws in which the keyword had a meaning unrelated to health emergency 
preparedness were excluded (e.g., bus shelters);  
(3) Laws pertaining to the evacuation of vehicles (e.g., trains) or rides (e.g., fun 
houses) were excluded;  
(4) Laws addressing only fire-related evacuation were excluded;  
(5) Laws addressing only casino emergencies were excluded. 
 
As a quality control measure, the identified laws were compared to existing, publically 
available lists of emergency health laws from the Network for Public Health Law and the 
Johns Hopkins Center for Law and the Public’s Health (NPHL, 2012; Center for Law and 
the Public’s Health, 2013). When a discrepancy arose, members of the study team 






Three electronic data extraction forms (one for each of the three searches) were created in 
Qualtrics (Provo, UT, U.S.), an online survey and data collection program. These forms 
were then used to abstract information from the full text of the statutes and regulations 
previously determined to be relevant for each of the authorities of interest. The 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officers (ASTHO) Emergency Declarations & 
Authorities–State Analysis Guide (2011), as well as the study’s research questions, 
informed the development of the fields in each data extraction form. Abstracted data 
allowed for a comparison of the four states’ laws with respect to the three types of 
emergency authorities and an understanding of the legal context that existed in Delaware, 
Maryland, New Jersey, and New York at the time of Hurricane Sandy.    
 
The final materials included: a study protocol, which documents each step in the 
identification of laws and subsequent data abstraction; a list of all query results; the full 
text of all relevant laws; three data extraction forms; and an abstracted legal data set. To 
foster reliability of findings, the study protocol and data extraction forms are provided in 




When Hurricane Sandy struck, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York all had 
laws in place allowing their state government to declare an emergency. In contrast, only 
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two of the four Mid-Atlantic states – Maryland and New Jersey – had laws enabling the 
government to declare a distinct health emergency, which generally refers to a situation 
in which the occurrence or threat of exposure to a hazard would result in significant 
morbidity or mortality (Table 6) (Md. Code Ann., Public Safety, 2013e; NJ. Code Ann., 
2013a). While none of the Mid-Atlantic states had explicitly authorized the government 
to order shelter-in-place, all four Mid-Atlantic states had enacted laws explicitly enabling 
the government to order evacuation at the time of Hurricane Sandy. Table 7 summarizes 
the legal variation among the Mid-Atlantic states for declaring an emergency, declaring a 
distinct health emergency, and ordering an evacuation.  
 
Authority to Declare an Emergency 
 
 
When Hurricane Sandy occurred, through statutory law Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, 
and New York all had empowered the governor to declare an emergency.  
Delaware: Delaware assigns responsibility for addressing “the dangers to life, health, 
environment, property or public peace within the State by emergencies or disasters” to its 
governor. The governor is responsible for directing the Delaware Emergency 
Management Agency and may issue any order, proclamation, or regulation necessary to 
manage the emergency. When an emergency is beyond local government control, the 
Delaware governor may also assume operational control over emergency management 
functions (Del. Code Ann., 2013a).  
 
Maryland: When the governor declares a state of emergency, state and local emergency 
response plans are activated and the deployment, distribution, and use of resources is 
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authorized. The Director of the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) is 
responsible for coordinating emergency response activities of state agencies and affected 
political subdivisions (Md. Code Ann., Public Safety, 2013b). After declaring a state of 
emergency, the Maryland governor may also promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and 
regulations necessary to protect life and property or to manage and end the emergency 
(e.g., control traffic in the emergency area, designate emergency zones, compel 
evacuation, etc.) (Md. Code Ann., Public Safety, 2013b; Md. Code Ann., Public Safety, 
2013c). 
 
New Jersey: In addition to authorizing the governor to proclaim an emergency if he or 
she deems it necessary, New Jersey law allows the governor to assume control of all 
emergency management operations and commandeer the services and property necessary 
to protect or promote public health, safety, and welfare (NJ. Code Ann., 2013d).  
 
New York: In the event of an emergency declaration due to a radiological accident, the 
New York governor or his designee is responsible for overseeing the execution of the 
radiological emergency preparedness plan. New York law does not address oversight of 
emergency management operations for other types of emergencies or the issuing of 
emergency orders subsequent to a disaster emergency declaration (NY. Code Ann., 
2013b).  
 
While all four Mid-Atlantic states allocate this authority to the governor, the mechanism 
for declaring an emergency, the threshold for declaring an emergency, the required 
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content of a declaration, the requirements for notifying the public about and filing of the 
declaration, the period of effect, and the process for termination and renewal of orders 
vary by state (See Table 8). 
 
Authority to Declare a Health Emergency 
 
 
At the time of Hurricane Sandy, through statutory law, both Maryland and New Jersey 
had empowered the governor to declare a distinct health emergency (See Table 9) (Md. 
Code Ann., Public Safety, 2013e; NJ. Code Ann., 2013a). In Maryland, upon 
determination that a “situation in which extensive loss of life or serious disability is 
threatened imminently because of exposure to a deadly agent,” the governor can declare a 
“catastrophic health emergency” by issuing a proclamation (Md. Code Ann., Public 
Safety, 2013e). The New Jersey governor may declare a “public health emergency” in the 
event of a biological, chemical, or nuclear attack (or accidental release); the appearance 
of a novel or previously eradicated biological agent; or a natural disaster (NJ. Code Ann., 
2013a). This authority is exercised by issuing an executive order, but the governor is 
explicitly required to consult with the Commissioner of Health and Senior Services and 
the Director of the State Office of Emergency Management. Once declared, the 
Commissioner is responsible for coordinating the public health response to the health 
emergency in conjunction with the State Office of Emergency Management and in 
accordance with the State Emergency Operations Plan (NJ. Code Ann., 2013a). Although 
Delaware law defines a “public health emergency,” it does not explicitly allocate this 
authority to a specific government official or indicate how such authority would be 
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exercised (Del. Code Ann., 2013c). New York has no law allowing for the declaration of 
a health emergency (Table 6).  
Authority to Order Shelter-in-Place or Evacuation 
 
At the time of Hurricane Sandy, none of the four Mid-Atlantic states had enacted statutes 
or regulations explicitly granting the government the authority to order “shelter-in-place,” 
the protective action in which people take immediate refuge wherever they are (CDC, 
n.d.). While all four Mid-Atlantic states had enacted laws enabling the government to 
order evacuation (i.e., mass physical movement of people in response to a threat), the 
nature of this authority and the individuals empowered to execute it vary (See Table 10) 
(Quarantelli, 1980). In general, laws either allow the government to order evacuation of 
the public from an area when safety is imperiled or evacuation of a facility when 
conditions at that facility pose a threat.  
 
Both Delaware and Maryland have established two types of evacuation authority – the 
authority to direct and compel the evacuation of a geographical area (i.e., evacuation of 
the general population) or the authority to order evacuation of a specific facility. In the 
event of an emergency, the Delaware governor is authorized to “direct and compel the 
evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the 
State if this action is necessary for the preservation of life (Del. Code Ann., 2013b). 
Similarly, “after declaring a state of emergency, the [Maryland] governor, if the governor 
finds it necessary in order to protect the public health, welfare, or safety, may… direct 
and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from a stricken or threatened 
area” of Maryland (Md. Code Ann., Public Safety, 2013b). Both governors can also 
 36 
prescribe routes for evacuation, modes of transportation, and destinations. Additionally, 
when the Delaware Division of Public Health “reasonably believes that it is more likely 
than not that [a] facility or material may seriously endanger the public health” the 
Division is authorized to close, evacuate, or decontaminate said facility or material (Del. 
Code Ann., 2013d). Likewise, Maryland law establishes the authority to close, evacuate, 
and decontaminate a facility “if necessary and reasonable to save lives or prevent 
exposure to a deadly agent” (Md. Code Ann., Public Safety, 2013f). In contrast to DE, it 
is the governor in Maryland who is empowered with this authority and he or she must 
first proclaim a catastrophic health emergency.  
 
New Jersey law only addresses facility evacuation; it does not explicitly authorize 
ordering evacuation of the general population. In New Jersey, during a health emergency, 
the Commissioner of Health can close, evacuate, and decontaminate any facility that 
endangers public health (NJ. Code Ann., 2013b). The written order, which must be 
provided to the facility within 24 hours, must specify the facility to which it applies, the 
terms of and justification for the order, when the order becomes effective, and the 
potential for a hearing to contest the order. New Jersey regulations authorize the 
Commissioner of Health to suspend the license of a healthcare facility or the 
Commissioner of Human Services to suspend the license of a substance abuse treatment 
facility upon finding patient care violations or when unsafe conditions in the facility’s 
physical structure pose an immediate threat to the health, safety, and welfare of either 
patients or the general public (N.J.a.C., 2013a; N.J.a.C., 2013b). Upon the suspension of 
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its license, the healthcare or substance abuse treatment facility must transfer its patients, a 
process which is approved and coordinated by the respective licensing department.  
 
In New York, a county or city can order the evacuation of any person who either has no 
home or the use of their home jeopardizes their safety or the safety of others in the event 
of or in anticipation of an attack that threatens public health or safety (NY. Code Ann., 
2013d). Additionally, after declaring a local state of emergency, the chief executive of 
any county, city, town or village in New York is authorized to “promulgate local 
emergency orders to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation under 
control” (NY. Code Ann., 2013a). As an example, the law notes that if safety is imperiled, 
the chief executive can designate zones that people are prohibited from occupying (and 




When natural disasters such as hurricanes strike, public officials are faced with complex 
decisions to ensure the public’s health and safety. A common, crucial decision is whether 
to evacuate the vulnerable population of hospitalized patients or whether to have these 
patients and their care providers shelter-in-place for the duration of an emergency 
(Fairchild, Colgrove & Jones, 2006). Hospitalized patients, unlike the general public, 
cannot self-evacuate. They rely on public officials and hospital administrators not only to 
ensure their safety but also to ensure continuation of their health care regardless of 
whether they shelter-in-place or evacuate.  
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Unfortunately, during recent disasters – including Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy – 
hospitals have proved unable to sustain essential services after deciding to shelter-in-
place (Fink, 2009; Uppal et al., 2013).
 
In such circumstances, the government has a core 
duty to ensure that hospitals are evacuated. Public health legal preparedness plays an 
essential role in enabling the government to fulfill this duty by providing the necessary 
legal framework including the authority to declare an emergency, to declare a health 
emergency, and to order evacuation or shelter-in-place. 
 
At the time of Hurricane Sandy, the Mid-Atlantic states had achieved varying levels of 
public health legal preparedness for catastrophic coastal storms. All four Mid-Atlantic 
states had enacted laws empowering the governor to declare an emergency. However, the 
Mid-Atlantic states were less consistent in codifying the authority to declare a health 
emergency, order evacuation, or order shelter-in-place – public health measures which 
can enable the government to ensure health security and, in particular, protect already 
vulnerable populations such as hospitalized individuals.  
 
While Maryland and New Jersey have codified the authority to declare a health 
emergency, Delaware and New York have not. Codifying the ability to declare a health 
emergency typically ensures that the governor coordinates with the state’s senior health 
official, which may not occur with a general emergency declaration. For example, New 
Jersey law specifically provides that, “the governor, in consultation with the 
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commissioner [of health] and the Director of the State Office of Emergency Management, 
may declare a public health emergency” (NJ. Code Ann., 2013a).  
 
Moreover, codifying the authority to declare a distinct health emergency is important 
because it establishes and clarifies public health officials’ responsibility for and role in 
response operations. In New Jersey, when a health emergency is declared, a New Jersey 
statute specifies that the Commissioner of Health: 
Shall coordinate all matters pertaining to the public health response to a public 
health emergency, and shall have primary jurisdiction, responsibility and 
authority for: (1) planning and executing public health emergency assessment, 
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery for the State; (2) coordinating 
public health emergency response between State and local authorities; (3) 
collaborating with relevant federal government authorities, elected officials and 
relevant agencies of other states, private organizations or companies; (4) 
coordinating recovery operations and prevention initiatives subsequent to public 
health emergencies; and (5) organizing public information activities regarding 
public health emergency response operations(NJ. Code Ann., 2013a).  
 
During a coastal storm, this might mean assessing whether it is necessary to evacuate a 
hospital, coordinating with relevant agencies of other states or the federal government 
and private organizations to arrange for the transport of patients from one hospital to 
another, or arranging for the delivery of extra supplies to hospitals that shelter-in-place. 
In contrast, the law authorizing the New Jersey governor to declare a general emergency 
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has no requirement for the governor to coordinate with health officials nor does it identify 
any activities for which health officials would specifically be responsible (NJ. Code Ann., 
2013d). 
 
Similarly, the Maryland law codifying the authority to declare a health emergency 
addresses the role of the Secretary of Health (Md. Code Ann., 2013f). In 2009 Maryland 
Governor Martin O’Malley declared a health emergency in response to the H1N1 
influenza pandemic, exercising this authority for the first time since it was codified. This 
declaration conveyed the expectation for health authorities to lead response operations by 
explicitly authorizing the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene “to take other steps as 
are necessary to reduce the public health consequences of this influenza outbreak” 
(General Assembly of Maryland, 2010).  
 
Even without a codified authority to declare a health emergency, states may still be able 
to take necessary emergency management actions to control public health threats via a 
general emergency declaration or through the routine police powers delegated to health 
officials. For example, in New York, after the declaration of an emergency, the governor 
can direct state agencies to provide assistance including “distributing medicine, medical 
supplies, food and other consumable supplies…[and] performing on public or private 
lands temporary emergency work essential for the protection of public health and 
safety…” (NY. Code Ann., 2013c). The ability to address public health and safety and, 
more specifically, to make public health and medical countermeasures available through 
an emergency declaration may be one reason New York has not codified the authority to 
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declare a health emergency. However, even if states can manage health threats through a 
general emergency declaration, it is important to codify to authority to declare a distinct 
health emergency. Codifying the authority to declare a distinct health emergency not only 
contributes to improved public health legal preparedness by establishing clear lines of 
legal authority but also can improve the competence of the agents responsible for 
implementing such laws and enhance coordination between all parties with a role in a 
public health emergency response. 
 
In states that have codified the authority to declare a health emergency, challenges may 
still arise because their definition of “health emergency” is limited and may not include 
natural disasters. Recent hurricanes such as Katrina and Sandy have demonstrated that 
natural disasters have significant physical and mental health consequences (Shultz, 
Russell & Espinel, 2005). While the occurrence or imminent threat of a natural disaster 
constitutes a health emergency in New Jersey, it does not in Maryland or Delaware. 
Maryland defines a health emergency as “a situation in which extensive loss of life or 
serious disability is threatened imminently because of exposure to a deadly agent,” where 
“deadly agent” refers to “anthrax, ebola, plague, smallpox, tularemia; or other bacterial, 
fungal, rickettsial, or viral toxin; mustard gas, nerve gas; or other biological or chemical 
agent or radiation levels capable of causing extensive loss of life or serious disability” 
(Md. Code Ann., 2013d). In Delaware, neither a natural disaster nor nuclear or radiologic 
incident constitutes a health emergency. Due to these limited definitions, a health 
emergency could not have been declared in Maryland or Delaware in anticipation of 
Hurricane Sandy. Consequently, the Maryland Secretary of Health would not have had 
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the authority to order evacuation. While the Maryland Governor could have ordered 
evacuation, as discussed above, under a general emergency declaration, there is no 
explicit requirement for coordination with health officials. Similarly, a declaration of a 
state of emergency in Delaware would not require coordination with state health officials, 
who are most familiar with and regulate hospital operations.  
 
At the time of Hurricane Sandy, none of the four Mid-Atlantic states had explicitly 
authorized the government to order people to seek immediate refuge wherever they were 
(i.e., “shelter-in-place”). Sheltering-in-place may be necessary during an emergency to 
ensure safety, health, and welfare. For example, after the Boston Marathon bombing in 
2013, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick requested that Bostonians shelter-in-place 
while law enforcement officers were in pursuit of one of the bombing suspects. 
Bostonians submitted to this voluntary request, leaving the streets of Boston deserted 
(Salsberg, 2014).  
 
Whether this remarkable compliance was motivated by fear or the intense desire for 
officials to apprehend the suspect, the public may not be as willing to voluntarily shelter-
in-place in different emergency circumstances. To protect the public in instances of 
terrorism, as well as natural disasters and chemical or radiological accidents, it may be 
necessary for the government to mandate shelter-in-place. There may be little warning for 
incidents necessitating shelter-in-place such as active shooter situations, tornados, or 
chemical spills. In such circumstances, public health officials must be able to 
expeditiously order shelter-in-place. The lack of laws explicitly authorizing officials to 
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mandate shelter-in-place could delay the issuing of such orders by hindering the 
development of “implementation tools” (e.g., pre-drafted orders) or the ability and skills 
of public officials to understand and apply the law (Moulton, 2003). Without explicit 
legal authorities, public officials may be unaware of their powers and responsibilities 
relative to shelter-in-place or may be confused about how to exercise it.  
 
While the government will, at times, need to order people or entire facilities to shelter-in-
place, other emergencies will necessitate evacuation to ensure individuals’ safety. When 
Hurricane Sandy was approaching, all four Mid-Atlantic states had enacted laws enabling 
the government to order evacuation, but the scope and nature of these authorities differed. 
New Jersey only explicitly empowers the government with the authority to close, 
evacuate, and decontaminate a facility, which endangers public health, or to suspend the 
license of a healthcare or substance abuse facility and subsequently evacuate its patients 
(i.e., New Jersey does not codify area evacuation authority). The ability to order facility 
evacuation is an important public health tool that may be necessary in more contained 
emergencies (e.g., biological, chemical or radiological contamination of a hospital) or in 
response to emergencies that result in confined damage (e.g., earthquake or tornado 
resulting in infrastructure damage necessitating evacuation of individual hospitals). 
However, this authority alone may be inadequate to protect public health and safety since 
it does not enable preventive or area-wide action, which may be necessary with an 
approaching coastal storm. For example, these authorities would not permit ordering the 
evacuation of the general public from a threatened area prior to a storm’s landfall or 
ordering the evacuation of a hospital, which has not yet sustained physical damage, but 
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for which there is a reasonable threat of damage that would hinder continuity of patient 
care. Moreover, the nature of this authority, which requires the opportunity for a hearing 
to contest the order, is incongruent with the urgency necessary to achieve evacuation 
prior to the arrival of a hurricane – particularly evacuation of a hospital, which requires 




This research has several limitations. Although a thorough and systematic search 
methodology was employed, relevant laws may have been inadvertently excluded from 
the results. The scope of this research is limited to state-level statutes and regulations in 
four Mid-Atlantic states in place prior on October 22, 2012. Our findings do not include 
local (e.g., county, city, town, or village) ordinances, regulations, or orders. Practitioners 
and researchers have noted that disasters – and thus the most effective response to them – 
are local (Anderson & Hodge, 2013). At the time of Hurricane Sandy, both New Jersey 
and New York had state-level statutes that granted broad authority to local officials to 
declare and manage an emergency in their jurisdiction to protect health and safety (NJ. 
Code Ann., 2013c; NY. Code Ann., 2013a). In contrast, neither Maryland nor Delaware 
grant authority for declaring an emergency to their localities via statute. Local officials 
are uniquely positioned to respond to their communities’ needs in a disaster, as they are 
physically closer to those affected by an emergency and therefore, unless overwhelmed, 
typically able to respond more quickly. Moreover, they are more likely to understand 
their community’s needs and local officials are known within their communities. Future 
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studies should therefore examine local laws, which may also impact emergency response 
and evacuation of hospitals. In addition, to better understand public health legal 
preparedness on a national scale, future research should examine evacuation and shelter-




In an era of changing climate, where natural disasters are likely to occur with more force 
and more frequency, governments urgently need to prepare to fulfill their core duty to 
protect public health and safety. The law enables the government to fulfill this duty by 
providing necessary authority to order preventive or reactive response when safety is 
imperiled but clear authorities and responsibilities are essential. By providing a 
systematic inventory of existing emergency preparedness laws relevant to ensuring 
continuity of hospital care during coastal storms, this empirical research contributes to 
enhancing public health legal preparedness. States can further improve their readiness 
for catastrophic disasters by ensuring the explicit authority to declare a health emergency, 























Objective: During natural disasters, hospital evacuation may be necessary to ensure 
patient safety and care. However, little is known about how evacuation/shelter-in-place 
decision-making occurs. We aimed to examine perceptions of stakeholders involved in 
these decisions throughout the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States during Hurricane 
Sandy in October 2012.  
 
Methods: Semi-structured interviews were conducted from March 2014 to February 
2015 to characterize stakeholders’ perceptions about authority and responsibility for 
acute care hospital evacuation/shelter-in-place decision-making in Delaware, Maryland, 
New Jersey, and New York during Hurricane Sandy. Interviews were recorded, 
transcribed, and thematically analyzed using a framework approach.  
 
Results: We interviewed 42 individuals from 32 organizations. Hospital executives from 
all states reported having authority and responsibility for evacuation/shelter-in-place 
decision-making. In New York and Maryland, government officials stated they could 
order hospital evacuation whereas officials in Delaware and New Jersey said the 
government lacked enforcement capacity and therefore could not mandate evacuation.  
 
Conclusions: Among government officials, perceived authority for hospital 
evacuation/shelter-in-place decision-making was viewed as a prerequisite to ordering 
evacuation. When both hospital executives and government officials perceive themselves 
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to possess decision-making authority, there is the potential for inaction. There is value in 
a single entity bearing ultimate responsibility for hospital evacuation/shelter-in-place 
decision-making. 
 
Word count: 200/200 
 
Keywords: hospital evacuation, hospital shelter-in-place, organizational decision-making, 




Extreme weather events such as hurricanes can disrupt the delivery of healthcare services 
by damaging healthcare facilities and the infrastructure upon which they depend (The 
City of New York, 2013). Natural disasters have necessitated the evacuation of hospitals 
to ensure continuity of medical care (Bagaria et al., 2009). Moreover, failure to 
preemptively evacuate may endanger patient and staff safety (Powell, 2012). However, 
evacuation is not without consequences.  
 
During Hurricane Sandy in October 2012, several hospitals sustained flooding and 
damage to their electrical systems and emergency generators (Farley, 2013). The 
subsequent loss of lighting, elevators, and water pressure placed patients and workers at 
risk of injury and illness and resulted in post-event evacuation. At Bellevue Hospital in 
New York City, to maintain power after fuel pumps failed, hundreds of hospital staff 
formed a bucket brigade passing 5-gallon drums of fuel up 13 flights of stairs to the fuel 
tank (Uppal et al., 2013). At neighboring New York University Langone Medical Center 
(NYULMC), when a 14-foot storm surge caused the emergency generator to fail, staff 
members evacuated 322 patients down as many as 17 flights of stairs (Adalja et al., 2014).  
 
In addition to causing staff to perform strenuous, unfamiliar tasks – a known risk factor 
for occupational injury – power loss may necessitate consideration or implementation of 
altered standards of care (McGwin, Taylor, MacLennan & Rue, 2005). In the Intensive 
Care Unit (ICU) at Bellevue, when power loss seemed imminent during Hurricane Sandy, 
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staff considered which patients should be prioritized for access to six outlets powered by 
a backup generator; those not prioritized would have been manually ventilated had power 
been lost. Additionally, diagnostic imaging and laboratory services were unavailable 
(Uppal et al., 2013). At NYULMC, Neonatal ICU patients were manually ventilated 
under minimal lighting as they were evacuated down the stairs (Davies, 2012).  
 
Although extreme weather may compel hospital evacuation, decisions to shelter-in-place 
or evacuate hospitals are complex and involve many stakeholders. A “hospital evacuation 
decision team” typically includes an incident commander, hospital administrators, and 
emergency staff (Zane et al., 2010). Other stakeholders include public health, emergency 
management, and emergency medical service (EMS) officials. In addition, hospital trade 
associations, which represent evacuating and receiving facilities, may be key stakeholders 
in the decision-making process (Adalja et al., 2014).   
 
Limited peer-reviewed research on hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-
making exists (Bagaria et al., 2009). With a few exceptions (Downey et al. 2013a; 
Downey et al., 2013b; McGlown, 2001),
 
the majority of studies have considered the 
experience of single healthcare facilities (Kline, 2007; McSwain, 2010),
 
units within 
hospitals (Espiritu et al., 2014), or individual patients (Ramme et al., 2015). Although 
there has been increasing emphasis on the development of hospital evacuation plans post-
Katrina (Center for Bioterrorism Preparedness and Planning, 2006; Minnesota DOH, 
n.d.), as well as guidance, including the creation of an extensive Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality decision guide (California Hospital Association, 2010; HSPH 
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EPREP, 2012; Zane et al., 2010), little is known about how decision-making occurs in 
practice. Examinations of entire facility evacuations during Hurricane Sandy have been 
limited to case reports from two public hospitals (Ofri, 2012; Ricci et al., 2015; Uppal et 
al., 2013) and two studies focused on experiences at receiving facilities (Adalja, 2014; 
VanDevanter et al., 2014). There remains a lack of information on decision-making 
processes (i.e., how information is gathered, weighed, and acted upon), particularly when 
evacuation must be decided upon for multiple healthcare institutions in close proximity to 
one another. 
 
The tremendous size of Hurricane Sandy provided a unique opportunity to study hospital 
evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making at numerous hospitals. To address this 
gap in the literature, this study examined, what are the perspectives of Mid-Atlantic 
government officials and hospital executives regarding authority and responsibility for 




Between March 2014 and February 2015, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with key informants in Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York to examine 
acute care hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making during Hurricane 




Selection and Recruitment of Participants  
 
News media stories, press releases, and governmental reports were reviewed to identify 
organizations for inclusion. Interviewees, who were selected based on their functional 
role, were purposively sampled to include at least one hospital representative per state 
and a public health and emergency management official from the hospital’s jurisdiction. 
Hospital interviewees included executives (e.g., chief executive officer) or senior 
managers (e.g., director of emergency management). Governmental interviewees were 
senior leaders (e.g., commissioner/secretary of health). Snowball sampling was used to 
identify additional participants. 
 
To be eligible for inclusion, during Hurricane Sandy, an interviewee must have been 
employed in Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, or New York, by either a(n): 1) hospital, 
2) health department, 3) office of emergency management, or 4) other organization, 
which was responsible for or significantly involved in the decision to shelter-in-place or 
evacuate hospitals during Hurricane Sandy. Hospitals were excluded if they never 
considered whether to evacuate, which was confirmed by asking the hospital itself. 
Potential interviewees were excluded if they lacked direct knowledge of decision-making. 
Each state’s health department and hospital association– except for New York, where the 






We developed a semi-structured interview guide organized into the following domains: 
authorities and responsibilities; decision processes and lessons learned. The guide was 
piloted with an emergency management official and revised based on feedback from pilot 
testing and several healthcare preparedness experts.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in-person or via phone when an in-person 
meeting was not feasible. One health department opted for a facilitated group discussion. 
Interviewees were assigned a unique, random study identification number, which was 
used for all study materials. Interviews were audio-recorded with the permission of 
interviewees and transcribed. The interviewer listened to audio recordings and corrected 
any transcription errors.  
 
Data Analysis  
 
After each interview, a contact summary sheet was completed documenting immediate 
reflections (Miles et al., 2014). To enhance analytic rigor and reliability, peer debriefing 
was conducted throughout data collection and analysis (Lincoln et al., 1985). An 
impartial peer with expertise in the subject matter and research methods, but no other role 
in the study, reviewed and critiqued data collection and analysis.  
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A framework analytical approach was used to systematically search for patterns and 
generate descriptions for understanding the phenomenon of hospital evacuation/shelter-
in-place decision-making (Gale et al., 2013). Transcripts were thematically coded using 
QSR Nvivo for Mac v10.1.3 (Burlington, MA, U.S.). A codebook was developed with a 
priori codes based on research questions and conceptual models of healthcare facility 
evacuation decision-making from the peer-reviewed literature (Dobalian et al., 2010; 
McGlown, 2001). Other thematic codes were inductively identified and iteratively 
applied (Appendix 12). Structural codes (e.g., state, informant’s sector, evacuation status) 
were applied to organize the data.  
 
The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review Board 
determined this study was not human subjects research and was therefore exempt from 




Sixty-one representatives from 41 organizations were contacted for interviews. Of the 50 
individuals meeting study inclusion criteria, 84% (n=42) agreed to be interviewed (Table 
11). One public health official and one hospital representative each from New York 
declined to participate. In both cases, other representatives from these organizations 
participated in this research. Non-response was also minimal. Only three emergency 
management officials and one hospital representative did not respond to initial or follow-
up recruitment messages. In one instance, another representative from their organization 
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participated in this research. Additionally, two individuals – one emergency management 
official and one hospital representative – agreed to be interviewed but ultimately did not 
participate in an interview due to logistical challenges. 
 
Between March 2014 and February 2015, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with 42 key informants from 31 organizations. Additionally, one organization provided a 
written statement, which was analyzed in the same manner as interview transcripts, but 
was unable to participate in an interview due to ongoing emergency response activities. 
Key informants worked for organizations representing 5 public health emergency 
response sectors: hospital (45%), hospital association (5%), public health agency (26%), 
emergency management agency (17%), and EMS agency (7%). Twelve percent were 
employed in Delaware, 29% in Maryland, 31% in New Jersey, and 29% in New York 
(Table 12).  
 
Key informants were asked to describe their perceptions about authority and 
responsibility for hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making during 
Hurricane Sandy. These perceptions are organized into views of hospital and hospital 
association informants
17
 and government informants (i.e., public health, emergency 
management, and EMS officials).  
 
  
                                                             
17
 As individuals from only one hospital association were interviewed in this study, perspectives of its 
employees are presented with those of hospital sector interviewees. Additionally, perspectives of 
interviewees from two public sector hospitals were included among hospital interviewees as they reflect 




The perspectives of hospital key informants (n=21) were consistent across Mid-Atlantic 
states and are accordingly presented collectively below. Hospital informants perceived 
their institutions to have authority and responsibility to decide whether to shelter-in-place 
or evacuate hospitals during a disaster. They ascribed decision-making authority to their 
hospital’s chief executive officer (CEO). In some cases, hospital informants indicated 
that this authority had been delegated to other members of the executive leadership team 
(e.g., chief operating officer or chief nursing officer), often referred to as the “C-Suite” or 
administrators acting as incident commander of a disaster. One hospital executive stated, 
“I’m the CEO of the hospital, right, and the ultimate decision on whether to evacuate or 
not rests with me. ” In discussing the decision during Hurricane Sandy, another CEO said, 
“Quite frankly, it was my decision based on just input of a couple of hours with a lot of 
people and I just used my instincts and my experience and made the decision.”  
 
There was one exception in which an informant from a public hospital perceived 
evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making authority to rest not with the hospital but 
with leadership of the overarching hospital system in coordination with the senior-most 
local public health official. This hospital executive stated,  
“[I]t's not a decision that would be made by [my hospital]
18
 alone or even 
certainly not by me as Incident Commander in my role and not by the [CEO]...it 
was pretty much [a local health official], [president of our health system] 
decision.”  
 
                                                             
18
Throughout this paper, the names of specific people, their titles and their institutions have been replaced 
in quotations with generic terminology to ensure anonymity of interviewees and their organizations.  
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One CEO noted that fulfilling the responsibility to shelter-in-place or evacuate hospitals 
is challenging since emergency preparedness is often not a top priority for healthcare 
executives. This CEO stated,  
"In the C-suite…[w]e have managing expenses, strategic development, electronic 
health records, what is ICD-10 coding, all that stuff. So where's community 
preparedness? And the answer is it's not there...usually the life safety stuff and the 
emergency preparedness stuff ends up getting delegated to an assistant 
administrator or to the director of safety and security or...the chief engineer or 
something like that."  
This perspective was confirmed by emergency management officials who indicated that 
although hospitals participated in preparedness activities, they often assigned lower-level 
staff, who do not possess decision-making authority and may not even be consulted by 
senior hospital administrators during disasters, to collaborate with emergency 
management.  
 
Hospital informants also recognized that their facilities could be ordered or mandated to 
evacuate by the state or local government with the exception of Veterans Administration 
facilities, which are under federal jurisdiction. Yet, several hospital informants perceived 
the state government as unwilling or unable to provide guidance or exercise this authority. 
One informant described their hospital’s experience during Hurricane Irene stating,  
“The state was not requiring or mandating any kind of evacuation, and they 
really left it up to the hospital to decide with truly very little guidance. And as the 
guy sitting in the hot seat as incident commander during that event it made us feel 
very much alone. The state was not willing to recommend a course of action.”  
 
Other hospital informants perceived state government officials, who are located in the 
capital or a significant distance away, as lacking the situational awareness necessary to 
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provide relevant guidance. When asked whether their state department of health provided 
decision-making guidance during Hurricane Sandy, one hospital informant stated,  
“Well, we didn’t even try with the health department. We didn’t even think to try. 
I mean I don’t know what they would’ve done. They’re in [the capital]. We’re on 
the ground. And I guess I would respond the same way to [the Department of 
Health and Human Services] (HHS) or anybody else. I mean I think at that time 
and place having drilled and having gone through all the what-ifs at some point I 
think you have to make your own decision. Somebody’s not going to make it for 
you.”  
 
Despite knowledge of the government’s legal authority to mandate evacuation, the 
perceived inability of state government to provide useful guidance furthered the belief 





In contrast to hospital key informants, government officials’ (n=21) perceptions about 
authority and responsibility for evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making during 




New York government informants (n=3) described a locality’s chief executive as having 
the authority to order evacuation. They clarified, however, that this authority did not 
infringe upon a hospital’s right to evacuate. One government informant explained, “[A] 
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healthcare facility, if they feel that they need to evacuate, they can evacuate any time for 
any reason.” Another government informant believed healthcare facilities had not only 
authorization but moreover an obligation to evacuate when necessary. This informant 
stated,  
“[A] facility always has a right to evacuate themselves for patient safety, always, 
always. And it’s their responsibility…. At the end of the day, it’s not the 
government’s responsibility to evacuate you, it’s the facilities [that are] 
responsible for the patient.”  
 
New York government informants perceived hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place 
decisions as complicated because the state department of health licenses and regulates 
healthcare facilities. While they recognized the local chief executive’s evacuation 
authority, they described how only the state commissioner of health has authority to 
permit healthcare facilities to shelter-in-place. Furthermore, New York government 
officials defined “shelter-in-place” differently from neighboring states as well as New 
York hospitals. New York government officials perceived shelter-in-place to be a 
protective action that would occur only when a mandatory evacuation was ordered by the 
chief executive. One New York government official explained,  
“Without that ordered evacuation, there is no shelter-in-place because there's no 
evacuation being ordered. It's a technical nuance that you need to understand 
because what happened in Sandy was there were no ordered evacuations for 
healthcare facilities therefore there was no authorized shelter in place…therefore 
those facilities that stayed technically were not sheltering place they just were 
stuck in the storm....” 
 
In contrast, and similar to key informants from all sectors in Delaware, Maryland, and 
New Jersey, New York hospitals perceived shelter-in-place as an alternative to 
evacuation where everyone within a hospital takes refuge or “shelters” onsite. New York 
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hospitals that did not evacuate during Hurricane Sandy described themselves as having 
sheltered-in-place.  
 
Due to the complexity of these regulatory and emergency authorities, New York 
government informants described healthcare facility evacuation and shelter-in-place 
decision-making in New York as a necessarily collaborative process involving the state 




In Maryland, government informants (n=8) described possessing “clear lines of authority” 
to mandate hospital evacuation. Most government informants ascribed this authority to 
their governor or public health officials (i.e., secretary of health; local health officer). 
Maryland government officials described evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-
making as a collaborative process between government officials and hospitals, noting that 
the government’s authority would only be exercised if a hospital failed or refused to 
evacuate and public health was endangered. One government informant stated,  
“Before the decision to order the [hospital] evacuation [during Hurricane Irene] 
was done, there was a-- we’ve always attempted more of a collaborative 
approach with the folks who are in charge of these facilities. The other two 
nursing homes that we approached said, ‘We don’t want to go, but if you guys feel 
uncomfortable about it, we’re out of here.’ When we approached [the hospital], 
of course they said, ‘We just rebuilt our facility, we are good to go, leave us alone’ 





Government informants from New Jersey (n=8) did not describe themselves as able to 
order hospital evacuation. Some New Jersey government informants doubted whether 
laws granted them authority to order evacuation. Other government officials were aware 
of laws authorizing them to order evacuation, but they believed they could not mandate 
hospital evacuation because they lacked any means of enforcement. One New Jersey 
government informant stated,  
“[T]he Commissioner's broad powers do allow her -- and frankly, and I 
unfortunately have to go back to OEM [Office of Emergency Management], 
because they have the operational capability -- yes, the Commissioner 
respectfully has broad powers. But the Commissioner's broad powers are not 
going to be carried out by the quote/unquote health department police.”  
 
New Jersey government informants perceived evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-
making as being ultimately a hospital decision. According to one informant, “[W]e can 
recommend an evacuation of a hospital, but really the decision to evacuate a hospital 




Though Delaware government informants (n=2) acknowledged the government’s legal 
authority to order evacuation, they believed “mandatory” evacuation was a misnomer 
because the government lacks the capacity to enforce compliance. One Delaware 
government official noted,  
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“There’s actually no mandatory evacuation law. In other words, it is a 
recommendation really. I mean, we can say it’s, ‘Hey, we’re ordering this 
evacuation by order of the Governor,’ but a private entity or a private resident 
does not have to abide by that law because there is no enforcement leg or penalty.”  
This informant explained,  
“The only time we can physically force somebody out of a structure-- residential 
structure or a commercial structure, is for a residential or a commercial building 
code violation that would violate the safety, health and welfare that-- and we can 
order the shutdown of the building and the removal of the occupants. However, 
then that has to follow the normal code enforcement violation process, which is a 
ten-day hearing. It can be emergency order.” 
 
Delaware government informants perceived the nature of their authority as incongruent 




The wide geographic area impacted by Hurricane Sandy provided a rare opportunity to 
examine hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making at numerous acute care 
hospitals throughout the U.S. Mid-Atlantic region. This research centered on stakeholders’ 
perceptions of authority and responsibility for these decisions.  
 
A key finding was that hospital executives in the Mid-Atlantic region, consistent with 
those in other regions of the country, perceive themselves to have authority and 
responsibility for hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions (GAO, 2006). Our 
results also indicated that in New York and Maryland, government officials, too, 
perceived themselves as having authority to order evacuation. One concern raised by 
these findings is that if both hospital executives and government officials have authority 
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for these decisions, each party might assume the other will act and neither will decide to 
evacuate despite necessity. For example, in a statement to the press, NYULMC 
representatives tried to deflect blame when flooding and power loss forced the hospital to 
evacuate in the middle of Hurricane Sandy (Farley, 2013; Italie & Marchione, 2012). Yet, 
in testimony before the New York City Council, Thomas Farley, Commissioner of the 
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, stated, “Healthcare facilities 
could have decided on their own to evacuate” (Farley, 2013). These findings suggest that, 
while it may be feasible for multiple parties to have authority to order evacuation, a 
single party should bear ultimate responsibility for the decision.  
 
In 2012, when Hurricane Sandy was approaching the Mid-Atlantic, Delaware, Maryland, 
New Jersey, and New York had laws in place that allowed their respective governments 
to order evacuation (McGinty, Rutkow, & Burke, 2015). New York City Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg exercised this authority during Hurricane Irene in 2011 when he ordered the 
evacuation of at least 7,000 patients from all hospitals and most chronic care facilities in 
New York City’s Evacuation Zone A (Bloomberg, 2011; Farley, 2013).
19
 In advance of 
Hurricane Irene, Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley ordered the evacuation of 
McCready Foundation, an acute care hospital with an attached nursing and rehabilitation 
center in Somerset County (General Assembly of Maryland, 2012). In contrast, despite 
possessing the authority, neither New Jersey nor Delaware ordered hospital evacuations 
during Hurricanes Irene or Sandy. This information, coupled with our finding that 
                                                             
19
 At the time of Hurricanes Irene and Sandy, Zone A was New York City’s most at-risk area for inundation 
by storm surge. As part of the City’s coastal storm plan, this was the first area of the City what would be 
evacuated. Since Sandy, the zones have been redefined with Zone 1 being the most likely to flood (NYC 
OEM, n.d.). 
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officials from Delaware and New Jersey did not perceive themselves as able to enforce 
hospital evacuation, suggests that confidence in one’s authority is likely requisite to the 
exercise of said authority. Public health law researchers should educate government 
leadership about existing laws that enable them to order hospital evacuation when public 
safety is endangered. Additionally, further research should examine whether existing 
authorities could be enhanced to address concerns about lack of compliance with 
mandatory evacuation orders. 
 
Our results confirm a lack of engagement by hospital executives in emergency 
preparedness activities, which is consistent with prior research (ACHE, 2014; Batts, 
2015). Given their perceived authority and responsibility for evacuation and shelter-in-
place decisions, senior hospital executives in the Mid-Atlantic region will likely be the 
ultimate decision-makers for future facility-initiated evacuations. Therefore, more efforts 
should be made to engage them in emergency preparedness activities. The 2014 Joint 
Commission standards for emergency management are an important step forward for 
improving leadership accountability for and engagement in preparedness activities (The 
Joint Commission, 2013). However, to guarantee their engagement throughout the 
disaster management life cycle, it may be necessary to link emergency preparedness to 
hospital executives’ existing priorities. For example, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services has proposed a regulation that would tie disaster planning to 
conditions of participation for Medicare and Medicaid (ACHE, 2014; NARA, 2013). 
Additional steps could include emergency management training during masters-level 
degree programs commonly completed by healthcare executives (e.g., MHA, MBA). 
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Finally, the American College of Healthcare Executives could incorporate emergency 
preparedness training and experience into its credentialing requirements for fellowship 
and continuing education (ACHE, 2009; ACHE, n.d.).  
 
Another key finding from this study is that lack of a shared definition of “shelter-in-place” 
resulted in miscommunication between public health and emergency management 
officials and hospitals in New York City during Hurricane Sandy. The lack of common, 
clear terminology has the potential to result in undesired and even harmful emergency 
management actions. The use of common terminology is a key tenet of the National 
Incident Management System and the Incident Command System for emergency 
response. Besides being a condition of federal preparedness grant funding since fiscal 
year 2006, employing plain language and common vocabulary in emergency response 
ensures that all incident managers and responders understand one another (FEMA, 2009). 
At minimum, public health officials should explicitly define and publically communicate 
– both to hospitals and patients – what it means for a hospital to “shelter-in-place.” Given 
the increasing number of health systems that operate across jurisdictional boundaries and 
that major emergencies could necessitate evacuating patients to neighboring states, states 







This research considered perspectives of hospital and government key informants from 
four Mid-Atlantic states. A systematic methodology was employed to identify and recruit 
participants who were responsible for hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-
making during Hurricane Sandy; however, relevant informants may have been 
inadvertently omitted and there is potential for selection bias. Due to the retrospective 
design of this study, participants’ responses may have been limited by recall bias. The 
perspectives of these informants – particularly those operating in New York City, where 
there is a high density of healthcare facilities – may have limited generalizability. It is 
likely, however, that study findings will be applicable to other big cities, as well as during 




Decisions to shelter-in-place or evacuate hospitals during extreme weather events are 
complex and further complicated by the numerous stakeholders involved. This research 
addresses gaps in the literature about how these complex decisions occur in practice by 
examining stakeholders’ perceptions of authority and responsibility for decision-making 
during Hurricane Sandy. Among government officials, perception of authority for 
hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making was a prerequisite to ordering 
hospital evacuation. Some hospital executives in the Mid-Atlantic region had limited 
prior engagement in disaster preparedness. Given their perceived authority and 
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responsibility for evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions, increased efforts should be 
made to prepare hospital executives for their anticipated role in crisis decision-making. In 
jurisdictions where hospital executives and government officials both perceive 
themselves to possess authority for hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-
making, there is the potential for no decision to be made. To ensure that implementation 
of either hospital evacuation or shelter-in-place is not delayed by confusion regarding 
who has authority and responsibility for these decisions, a single entity should bear 













Decision Processes and Determinants of Hospital Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place 






Context: Evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making for hospitals is complex and 
existing literature contains little information about how these decisions are made in 
practice. 
 
Objective: To describe decision-making processes and identify determinants of acute 
care hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place during Hurricane Sandy. 
 
Design: Semi-structured interviews were conducted from March 2014 to February 2015 
with key informants who had authority and responsibility for evacuation and shelter-in-
place decisions for hospitals during Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Interviews were recorded, 
transcribed, and thematically analyzed. 
 
Setting and Participants: Interviewees included hospital executives and state and local 
public health, emergency management, and emergency medical service officials from 
Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York. 
 
Main Outcome Measure(s): Interviewees identified decision processes and determinants 
of acute care hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place during Superstorm Sandy. 
 
Results: We interviewed 42 individuals from 32 organizations. Decisions-makers 
reported relying on their instincts and not employing guides or tools to make evacuation 
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and shelter-in-place decisions during Hurricane Sandy. Risk to patient health from 
evacuation, prior experience, cost, and ability to maintain continuity of operations were 
the most influential factors in decision-making. Flooding and utility outages, which were 
predicted to or actually impacted continuity of operations, were the primary determinants 
of evacuation.  
 
Conclusions: Evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making for hospitals can be 
improved by ensuring hospital emergency plans address flooding and include explicit 
thresholds that, if exceeded, would trigger evacuation. Comparative risk assessments that 
inform decision-making would be enhanced by improved collection, analysis and 
communication of data on morbidity and mortality associated with evacuation versus 
sheltering-in-place of hospitals. 
 
 
Word Count: 248 of 300 
 
Key words: hospital evacuation, shelter-in-place, decision-making, emergency 




On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall in Brigantine, New Jersey, 
ravaging the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States. Hurricane Sandy was the second 
costliest cyclone in U.S. record-keeping history and the largest named storm on record in 
the Atlantic Ocean. Of the 147 deaths directly attributed to Hurricane Sandy, nearly half 
occurred in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern U.S (Blake et al., 2013). In addition to 
resulting in direct mortality, Hurricane Sandy had devastating impacts on the Mid-
Atlantic region’s healthcare systems, particularly hospitals (The City of New York, 2013; 
OIG, 2014). In New York City alone, to ensure safety and continuity of medical care, 
approximately 6,300 patients were evacuated from 37 healthcare facilities (Farley, 2013).  
 
In Hurricane Sandy’s aftermath, researchers and news media questioned why hospitals 
that were in close proximity to one another and had ostensibly similar risk profiles made 
differing decisions about evacuation and shelter-in-place (i.e., stay onsite until danger 
passes) (Hartocollis et al., 2012). For example, due to a 14-foot storm surge, fuel pumps 
supplying backup generators at New York University Langone Medical Center were 
damaged necessitating the urgent evacuation of 322 patients – including 21 infants from 
the hospital’s Neonatal Intensive Care Unit – overnight during the storm (Espiritu et al., 
2014 ; VanDevanter et al., 2014). A short while later, nearby Bellevue Medical Center 
was evacuated for the first time in its 275-year history (Ofri, 2012; Uppal et al., 2013). In 
contrast, the Veterans Administration New York Harbor Healthcare System’s Manhattan 
Campus, which neighbors these facilities, had evacuated preemptively, thus avoiding the 
 72 
need for any emergency evacuation during the storm. There was also lingering 
uncertainty about why New York government officials had not ordered evacuation of 
hospitals in low-lying areas as they had in anticipation of Hurricane Irene in 2011 (Fink, 
2012). Commentators called for “clear and consistent criteria to guide evacuation 
decisions,” as well as integrated local and regional decision-making for sentinel events 
(Powell et al., 2012; Hanfling et al., 2013).  
 
In response to similar calls after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services funded the development of tools to support hospital 
evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making (Hassol et al., 2013; Zane et al., 2010). 
Additionally, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the Joint Commission 
require hospitals to have emergency plans, which could include evacuation procedures 
(CMS, 2004; The Joint Commission, 2012; 42 CFR 482.41). Given the existence of these 
resources and requirements, questions arise about whether decision-makers are familiar 
with and employ these tools, as well as whether these resources are effective. 
 
In November 2012, the Institute of Medicine convened an expert working group to 
establish a Science Preparedness agenda for Hurricane Sandy (HHS, 2015; NYAM, 
2013). Participants identified determining what criteria informed healthcare facility 
evacuation decision-making during Sandy as a top priority, as well as whether decision-
makers used guidelines, tools, and literature to assist them in these decisions. The 
existing literature contains little information about these priority areas. One study has 
examined hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making processes during 
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Hurricane Sandy, but its generalizability is limited as it considers a single federal hospital 
facility (Ricci et al., 2015). Our study presents the results of interviews with government 
and hospital officials throughout the Mid-Atlantic region regarding evacuation and 
shelter-in-place decision-making during Hurricane Sandy. Findings may enable hospital 
executives and the public health emergency management community to better prepare for, 




Selection and Recruitment of Participants  
 
From March 2014 to February 2015, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key 
informants in four Mid-Atlantic states to identify factors that significantly influenced 
decisions to evacuate or shelter-in-place acute care hospitals during Hurricane Sandy. 
Interviewees were purposefully sampled to include at least one hospital representative 
from Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York, and one public health and one 
emergency management official whose areas of responsibility encompassed each hospital. 
Additional interviewees were added through snowball sampling.  
 
Hospital interviewees were senior leaders (e.g., chief executive officers (CEOs); directors 
of emergency management). Government participants included in the study were those 
who held senior leadership roles during Sandy (e.g., secretary/commissioner of health; 
director of emergency management). Potential interviewees were excluded if they lacked 
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direct knowledge about decision-making or if their employer never considered evacuation 
during Hurricane Sandy.  
 
Each state hospital association validated hospitals for inclusion, with the exception of 
New York, where the association for the metropolitan New York area was consulted. 
Additionally, each state health department and the New York City Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene were consulted to ensure relevant hospitals were not omitted.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in-person or via phone with the exception of 
one health department that preferred a facilitated group discussion. A semi-structured 
interview guide was piloted and revised based on feedback from the pilot interview and 
experts in healthcare emergency management. The guide included the following 
domains: decision processes, information and decision-making aids, and lessons learned. 
Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed with participant permission. Transcripts 
were compared to recordings and any errors were corrected. Study materials were labeled 
with unique, random identification numbers.  
 
To capture immediate reflections, contact summary sheets were completed after each 
interview (Miles et al., 2014). Peer debriefing was conducted throughout data collection 
and analysis to foster reliability and validity of findings (Lincoln et al., 1985). A 
combined deductive and inductive approach was used to identify themes. A priori themes 
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were selected based on relevant literature and our research objective (Dobalian et al., 
2010; McGlown & Campbell, 2002). Additional themes were generated through open, 
unrestricted coding. Transcripts were coded using QSR Nvivo for Mac v10.1.3 
(Burlington, MA, U.S.).  
 
A Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review Board 




Of the 50 individuals meeting study inclusion criteria, 84% agreed to be interviewed. 
Between March 2014 and February 2015, we interviewed 41 key informants from 32 
organizations. Additionally, one public health agency, which was unable to participate in 
an interview due to ongoing emergency response activities, provided a written statement 
(Table 11). Key informants (n=42) worked for organizations representing 5 sectors 
involved in public health emergency response: hospitals (n=19), hospital associations 
(n=2), public health agencies (n=11), emergency management agencies (n=7), and EMS 
agencies (n=3). Five key informants were employed in Delaware, 12 in Maryland, 13 in 
New Jersey, and 12 in New York (Table 12). Key informants described their institutional 
and community decision-making processes and identified determinants in the decisions to 




Hospital Evacuation - A Difficult Decision and Last Resort 
 
Key informants from all sectors and states reported that hospital evacuation and shelter-
in-place decision-making is extremely difficult. One informant remarked, “the evacuation 
order is the hardest thing that we will ever have to do in our careers….” Many 
informants expressed that these decisions could have no positive outcome. One informant 
said, “It is always going to be a hard decision because if you move everybody and [the 
storm] doesn't come then you get criticized and if you don't move everyone and it hits you, 
you get criticized.” Some key informants perceived the decision to evacuate as having 
catastrophic consequences for decision-makers and their institutions. As one informant 
said,“[T]his whole evacuation decision is like a career-ending decision.” He continued 
to describe consequences for hospitals stating, “There [are] hospitals in New Orleans, 
they evacuated, that’s the last thing they ever did. They never opened again.” 
Ultimately, key informants viewed evacuation as a last resort. One decision-maker said, 
“As a healthcare administrator, one of the things you learn early on is evacuation is like 
the last thing you do….” Reflecting on the decision not to evacuate during Hurricane 
Sandy, another informant stated, “Evacuating that facility is not something that we want 
to do. We really don't.  We want to keep it open at all costs….” 
 
Use and Adequacy of Decision-Making Aids and Emergency Plans  
 
Key informants from all states and sectors characterized hospital evacuation and shelter-
in-place decision-making as a collaborative process where decision-makers consulted 
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trusted advisors and then made a decision based on their implicit understanding of what 
needed to be done. Key informants recounted using weather forecast data; however, the 
majority did not report using decision-making guides to determine whether hospitals 
should be evacuated in light of these forecasts.  
 
When asked whether the hospital relied on any tools or checklists, one CEO whose 
hospital evacuated said, “One would think. That day we did not. We just worked on our 
instincts.” A public health official stated,  
“I use a common sense approach in terms of garnering all the facts, in terms of 
determining whether the patient is going to be in danger, and that to me is what 
the decision parameter is going to be. So maybe I’m old school and just common 
sense, I’m not going to rely on a lot of tools, I’m going to gather as much 
information as I can, and we’re going to have to make some credible decisions 
based upon what we know about their ability to continue to provide the service for 
the patients.”  
There was one exception to this sentiment: one hospital employed an existing decision 
tree, which was designed to help leadership determine whether to evacuate or shelter-in-
place, from its emergency operations plan.  
 
Some key informants explained that existing emergency plans did not meet their needs 
during Hurricane Sandy. For example, in New York City informants perceived the 
citywide coastal storm plan to be inadequate because its decision-making algorithm, 
developed after Hurricane Irene, described the roles of key stakeholders involved in 
decision-making but not how to determine whether a hospital should be evacuated. One 
New York City informant said,  
“T]here wasn’t a formalized decision-making process with criteria. I mean there 
was a decision-making algorithm but there wasn’t criteria for when to evacuate 
or not. There was a city storm plan and it said if there’s a hurricane you evacuate. 
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But [Sandy was] borderline between a tropical storm and a hurricane. And 
second of all, everyone recognizes that in some cases evacuating is risky. And so 
the written plan did not provide guidance really for the situation we were in and 
so we just used our judgment without any hard criteria….”  
Similarly, a CEO whose hospital evacuated reported that their emergency plans did not 
address the circumstances faced during Hurricane Sandy:  
“I mean we have emergency plans for a lot of different kinds of situations. Let’s 
say you have a shooter drill in town or mass casualties, something or other. I 
mean they have checklists and how-to’s for a lot of different situations. At the time, 
they did not have one anticipating this flooding.” 
 
While two hospital officials articulated thresholds for tolerable storm surge and wind that 
would have necessitated evacuation had they been exceeded, all other key informants 
indicated that their respective plans lacked explicit, pre-defined criteria or triggers for 
evacuating. 
 
Influential Factors and Determinants of Hospital Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place  
 
Key informants considered several factors, discussed below, in their determinations of 
whether to evacuate or shelter-in-place hospitals during Hurricane Sandy. The most 
influential factors were risk to patients, ability to maintain continuity of operations, and 
prior experience. Hospital executives also identified cost as an influential factor. The 
primary determinants of acute care hospital evacuations that occurred during Hurricane 




Risk to Patients 
 
All key informants perceived evacuating hospitalized patients as a “risky undertaking.” 
Many informants stated that hospitalized patients would be at risk of death or increased 
morbidity from the physical transportation and transfer of care. According to one 
informant, 
“[T]here’s a lot of risk in moving patients that are sick. Whether they’re critically 
sick or marginally sick or still need hospitalization, there’s a lot of risk and a lot 
of disruption, and a lot of uncertainty and discomfort for families. And then you 
have to assure the continuity of care for that patient. So that patient is starting 
over; and they’re starting over at a time when everyone is gearing up for a major 
emergency.” 
 
Another key informant explained their hospital’s hesitancy to evacuate stating, “we don’t 
want to move these patients because some of them might die.” Some key informants 
explicitly referenced literature on adverse health effects of evacuation, which influenced 
their decision-making during Sandy. One public health official stated, “[T]here’s 
literature of there being a mortality rate from evacuation itself. So there was no non-risky 
decision, so we’re weighing the risk of evacuating versus the risk of sheltering in place.”  
 
Continuity of Operations – Impact of Flooding and Utility Outages  
 
Key informants characterized their decisions as comparative risk assessments where they 
weighed the risks associated with evacuation against the potential for essential hospital 
services to fail while sheltering-in-place and the risk such interruptions would pose to 
patients. Although informants did not employ formal decision-making aids, they 
informally assessed whether hospitals could maintain continuity of operations (COOP). 
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Key informants were primarily concerned with whether hospitals would be able to sustain 
power though there was consideration of disruption to other essential utilities (e.g., water, 
steam, sewage, oxygen). They perceived storm surge or flooding as the primary threat to 
COOP. For hospitals that evacuated, disruption of utility services – whether pre-planned, 
anticipated, or sustained – was the most common determinant. 
 
Prior Experience  
 
Key informants perceived prior experience to significantly influence shelter-in-place and 
evacuation decision-making during Hurricane Sandy. Decision-makers reported relying 
on both their personal previous experience, as well as institutional knowledge of how 
their facilities had fared in prior storms. Hurricane Irene, which occurred one year before 
Hurricane Sandy, was perceived to influence shelter-in-place and evacuation decisions 
during Sandy. One informant stated, “the experience with Hurricane Irene and those 
evacuations, you know, it colored the response then to Sandy.” Another informant 
described the prior experience evacuating for Hurricane Irene as “the little boy that cried 
wolf.” The majority of informants perceived hospital evacuations during Irene as 
unnecessary and having resulted in decision-makers being hesitant to evacuate the 
following year. According to one New York informant,  
“We had been through Hurricane Irene. We had evacuated hospitals and nursing 
homes from Zone A for that and found it to be disruptive and dangerous. So we 
had that image in the back of our mind. And so when Sandy came in it looked like 




Hospital key informants from two different facilities reported that although evacuation 
during Hurricane Irene was ultimately unwarranted, the experience had a positive impact 
on decision-making during Hurricane Sandy. Serving as “the best exercise you could ever 
ask for,” it gave their hospitals confidence that they could successfully evacuate.  
 
Cost – A Consideration for Hospitals 
 
Government officials were adamant that cost was not a factor in their decision-making 
and that public safety was their primary concern. One public health official said, “I know 
there were questions in the wake of this, oh, well did you not evacuate because of a cost 
issue? And that absolutely never got into the conversation. Decisions were strictly based 
upon what we thought was the safest option.” 
 
In contrast, hospital key informants presented cost as a significant factor in evacuation 
and shelter-in-place decisions. Hospital informants felt the cost of evacuation and 
repatriation were nominal compared to the potential for lost revenue while their facilities 
were evacuated. One hospital informant who evacuated stated,  
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“We took obviously a financial hit. When you cancel all elective surgeries, you cancel all 
your outpatient visits, that's a financial hit. Again you have to look at risk and benefit 
obviously to put someone in harm's way for financial reasons is absurd, but I would be 
not truthful if I didn't say that's a consideration. You have to be fairly confident that you 
are going to sustain some kind of damage or risk for your patients before you make a 




Hospital evacuation is rare (Bagaria et al., 2009). This study capitalizes on a significant 
disaster to learn from the experiences of hospital executives and government officials 
who were faced with evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions during Hurricane Sandy. 
Results provide insight as to how evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions for acute care 
hospitals are made in practice as well as opportunities to increase resilience to future 
public health emergencies.   
 
This study revealed that key informants perceived hospital evacuation and shelter-in-
place decision-making as challenging. Our findings suggest that to improve decision-
making it is important to: (1) ensure decision-makers have and use objective data, (2) 
address deficiencies in existing emergency plans, and (3) ensure the use of decision-
making aids and tools when considering whether to shelter-in-place or evacuate a hospital. 
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Results of this study illustrate that government officials and hospital executives perceived 
evacuation to be risky. Studies have demonstrated that evacuation significantly 
exacerbates existing physical and mental health conditions among nursing home residents 
(Brown et al., 2012; Dosa et al., 2010). Yet, similar data on the effects of hospital 
evacuation are lacking. To our knowledge, only one study has examined morbidity and 
mortality associated with acute care hospital evacuation. This study, which analyzed a 
1983 evacuation of the Denver Veterans Administration Medical Center, found no 
increased mortality and limited excess morbidity in the month following evacuation 
(Blaser et al., 1985). The generalizability of this study may be limited given the hospital’s 
patient population and access to government and military resources.  
 
Many questions remain about the downstream health effects of hospital evacuation: Do 
hospital patients suffer delayed adverse health effects after evacuation? Do evacuation-
related deaths occur weeks or months later? Do pre- and post-event evacuations pose the 
same risks to patients? Given that decision-makers in our study reported basing 
evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions on health risks, additional research should be 
conducted to quantify longer-term mortality and morbidity (e.g., 30- and 90-day 
consequences) associated with evacuation versus sheltering-in-place for acute care 
hospitals. Objective data about differential mortality and morbidity associated with 




Another important finding from our research is that cost was recognized as an influential 
factor for hospital executives when making evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions. 
This represents an important contribution to hospital evacuation literature, which has not 
previously identified cost as a factor in healthcare or disaster managers’ decisions to 
evacuate (McGlown et al., 2002). Concerns about lost revenue from business 
interruptions should be used to incentivize hospital executives to invest in preparedness 
and mitigation initiatives to stave off evacuation. 
 
A significant problem identified by this study is that emergency plans did not meet the 
needs of decision-makers during Hurricane Sandy. Although the Joint Commission 
emergency planning requirements were updated post-Sandy, neither the standards in 
effect during Sandy nor the 2014 standards require hospital emergency plans to address 
how evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions will be made (The Joint Commission, 
2013). Both hospital and government emergency plans should include processes and 
criteria for determining whether hospitals should evacuate or shelter-in-place. The 
intensity of extreme precipitation and flooding are predicted to increase with climate 
change (Walsh et al., 2014). Given that this study identified flooding as one of the most 
common determinants of hospital evacuation during Hurricane Sandy, evacuation triggers 
should not be based solely on a storm’s designation as a hurricane or its Saffir-Simpon 
categorization, both of which are determined by wind speed. The scope of emergency 
plans should be broadened to address at minimum all coastal storms, not just hurricanes. 
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Finally, this study revealed that decision-makers relied on instincts rather than tools or 
guidance to make hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions. Presumably, 
hospitals that opted to shelter-in-place genuinely thought they could sustain COOP, 
although this was too often not the case. Using checklists or decision-making aids can 
ensure that important factors are not inadvertently overlooked, which may be more likely 
in decisions made under stress. Facility-specific decision-making aids should have 
objective criteria that, when informed by weather forecasts, would trigger evacuation. 
However, decision-making tools, aids, and guidance are of little utility if those 
responsible for evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions do not utilize them. While there 
is inherent uncertainty in weather forecasts and storms may exceed predictions, 
employing decision-making aids may enable hospital executives and government 




Our study is based on interview data collected 18 months after the event in question, and 
is therefore subject to recall bias and selection bias. However, the combination of 
purposeful and snowball sampling was most appropriate for identifying participants who 
possessed first-hand knowledge of evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making for 
hospitals during Sandy. Our study findings may also be limited by social desirability bias 
particularly given the high stakes and scrutiny of the decisions examined. Due to the 
density of acute care hospitals in the New York/New Jersey metropolitan area, the 
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generalizability of some findings may be limited, but it is likely most findings will be 




Decisions to shelter-in-place or evacuate hospitals during extreme weather events are 
challenging. This research, which addresses a priority area in the Hurricane Sandy 
Science Preparedness agenda, examines how these complex decisions occur in practice. 
Hospital and government emergency plans were inadequate during Hurricane Sandy. 
Responses to future public health disasters can be improved by ensuring that hospital 
emergency plans address flooding hazards and consider all coastal storms, not just those 
technically defined as hurricanes. Hospital emergency plans should specify how 
protective actions will be decided upon and include explicit criteria that would trigger 
evacuation, if exceeded. Additionally, access to morbidity and mortality data for hospital 
evacuation and sheltering-in-place would enable decisions-makers to more accurately 
compare risks and select the most appropriate protective action given the circumstances.  
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Discussion and Policy Implications 
Limitations  
 
Relevant laws may have been inadvertently excluded from the results of aim 1. The scope 
of the aim 1 research is limited to state-level statutes and regulations in four Mid-Atlantic 
states in place prior on October 22, 2012, when Sandy became a named storm. Selection 
of this date was intended to allow for a characterization of the legal environment that 
existed at the time public officials and hospital executives were faced with evacuation 
and shelter-in-place decisions for hospitals. Laws may have since been updated. Findings 
do not include local (e.g., county, city, town, or village) ordinances, regulations, or orders. 
Practitioners and researchers have noted that disasters – and thus the most effective 
response to them – are local (Anderson et al., 2013). At the time of Hurricane Sandy, 
both New Jersey and New York had state-level statutes that granted broad authority to 
local officials to declare and manage an emergency in their jurisdiction to protect health 
and safety (NJ. Code Ann., 2013c; NY. Code Ann., 2013a). In contrast, neither Maryland 
nor Delaware state law granted authority for declaring an emergency to their localities. 
Local officials are uniquely positioned to respond to their communities’ needs in a 
disaster, as they are physically closer to those affected by an emergency and therefore, 
unless overwhelmed, typically able to respond more quickly. Moreover, they are more 
likely to understand their community’s needs and local officials are known within their 
communities. Future studies should therefore examine local laws, which may also impact 
emergency response and evacuation of hospitals.  
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In addition, this study only examined laws in four states that were significantly impacted 
by Hurricane Sandy. To better understand public health legal preparedness for future 
coastal storms, similar analyses should be conducted for all areas that typically are (or as 
a result of climate change are predicted to be) affected by such storms (e.g., the gulf coast, 
the east and west coasts, pacific islands, great lakes basin). Lastly, while analysis of 
evacuation and shelter-in-place legal authorities in coastal zones should be prioritized, 
other emergencies besides coastal storms may necessitate evacuation or shelter-in-place 
of hospitals. To comprehensively prepare for all-hazards on a national scale, future 
research should examine evacuation and shelter-in-place laws in all of the remaining 
states, Washington, D.C., and the U.S. territories.  
 
The second and third aims of this research considered the perspectives of hospital 
executives and government officials who were responsible for evacuation and shelter-in-
place decision-making for hospitals in four Mid-Atlantic states during Hurricane Sandy. 
The combination of purposeful and snowball sampling was most appropriate for 
identifying participants who possessed first-hand knowledge of evacuation and shelter-in-
place decision-making for hospitals during Sandy. However, there is the potential for 
selection bias with this sampling strategy. A limitation of the key informant interview 
methodology it that its success is dependent upon participants’ ability and willingness to 
answer questions. Due to the retrospective design of this study, participants’ responses 
may have been limited by recall bias. It is possible that such recall bias might be more 
pronounced among participants who were not involved in a hospital evacuation, which 
was a significant and impressionable event for those who experienced it. Additionally, 
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findings may be subject to social desirability bias. Key informants may have been 
reluctant to share information that would reflect negatively on themselves or their 
organizations and thus could have responded in a way that they perceived as desirable or 
flattering. To reduce risk to organizations and participants, facilitate candor, and 
minimize social desirability bias, interviewees were granted anonymity and quotes were 
identified by stakeholder category and/or state only.  
 
Due to the density of acute care hospitals in the New York/New Jersey metropolitan area, 
the generalizability of some findings may be limited. It is likely, however, that study 
findings will be applicable to other big cities with similarly dense healthcare systems, as 
well as during future hurricanes and other natural disasters where healthcare facilities are 
once again faced with evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions.  
 
Lastly, although it would have been ideal to complement key informant interviews with 
direct or participant observation, Hurricane Sandy had already occurred when this 
research was conceptualized. Given the unpredictability of disasters and emergencies, as 
well as the lengthy time required to propose research and obtain institutional review 
board approval, it may be unrealistic for researchers to be present when crisis decisions 
are being made. Academic and other research institutions should consider how they can 
expedite institutional review board approval to enable important research to occur as soon 
as possible during and after a disaster to ensure that the finite window of opportunity to 
collect and analyze critical data and information is not missed. Moreover, the broader 
public health emergency management community should consider how to embed disaster 
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researchers in practice settings so that research and evaluation can occur while 
emergency response is ongoing.  
Strengths   
 
A comprehensive and systematic search methodology was employed in aim 1 to identify 
state statutes and regulations that may have affected evacuation and shelter-in-place of 
hospitals during Hurricane Sandy in 2012. This research translates legal information, 
which can be challenging to retrieve and understand, and makes it accessible to public 
health, healthcare, and emergency management practitioners and in doing so contributes 
to improving public health legal preparedness.  
 
A significant strength of this study is its very high response rate for key informant 
interviews. Eight-four percent of eligible key informants participated in interviews, the 
majority of which occurred in person allowing for rich discussion. Unlike prior studies, 
which with rare exception have examined the evacuation of single units or individual 
hospitals, this study investigated decision-making for 15 acute care hospitals located 
across four states. During Hurricane Sandy, there were 8 acute care hospitals that fully 
evacuated. Results of this study capture the perspectives of leaders involved in decision-
making for 6 of these 8 evacuating hospitals. In addition to including results related to 
facilities that evacuated both pre- and post-impact, findings also reflect the experiences of 
facilities that considered whether to evacuate but ultimately decided to shelter-in-place. 
Previous research has not typically captured the perspective of these “negative cases.”  
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Another major strength of this research is that key informants were purposefully sampled 
to ensure representation of a variety of stakeholders who were responsible for and 
involved in hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making. By including 
representatives from the healthcare, public health, emergency management, and 
emergency medical service sectors, as well as hospitals located in four states, this 
research was able to capture competing or divergent perspectives, as well as inter-state 
differences. The measures to validate the facilities and key informants who were included 
in this research were another strength of this study. By conferring with hospital 
associations and health departments, I was able to ensure that appropriate facilities were 
invited to participate and that the right key informants – those who had first-hand 
knowledge of decision-making in question – partook in this research. 
 
Hospital evacuation is rare (Bagaria et al., 20009). This study capitalized on an 
uncommon but significant event in which decision-making occurred simultaneously 
across multiple states and hospitals. Given the strengths discussed above, findings of this 
research are likely transferable to other geographic locations (e.g., other localities beyond 
the Mid-Atlantic region of the U.S. and potentially other countries with similar public 
health and healthcare infrastructure). These research findings may also be applicable to 
other types of emergencies (e.g., other natural disasters or man-made emergencies that 
occur with warning) or different healthcare organizations (e.g., nursing homes, long term 
care facilities). Lastly, the findings may be generalizable to other circumstances in which 
public health organizations face difficult decisions. By applying lessons identified in this 
research to future hurricanes and other circumstances (i.e., other geographies, 
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With the launch of the U.S. Sustainable and Climate Resilient Health Care Facilities 
Initiative, the White House noted that “American communities depend on hospitals to 
provide essential services at all times, and under all circumstances, and climate change 
places our hospitals and those services at risk” (The White House, 2014). While no one 
storm can be attributed to climate change, there is widespread recognition that global 
environmental change is occurring and that the severity of natural disasters, like 
Hurricane Sandy, has and will continue to increase as a consequence (Karl et al., 2009). 
Although the U.S. Climate Action Plan takes steps to reduce carbon pollution responsible 
for climate change, there is an urgent need to prepare for the impacts that are too late to 
be avoided and specifically to ensure that hospitals are able to respond to and are resilient 
to these impacts (Executive Office of the Presidents, 2013). This research identifies 
important steps that can be taken to facilitate public health legal preparedness for 
disasters and to improve evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making during future 
public health emergencies.  
Ensuring Public Health Legal Preparedness 
 
A core duty of government is to ensure the health and safety of its citizens (Gostin, 2008). 
As is evidenced by recent hurricanes including Katrina in 2005 and Sandy in 2012, at 
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times hospitals are unable to sustain essential services when sheltering-in-place and must 
be evacuated to ensure continuity of patient care, as well as the safety of patients and 
staff. It is incumbent upon the government to ensure that hospitals are evacuated when 
(and ideally before) these circumstances arise. Public health legal preparedness plays an 
essential role in enabling the government to fulfill this duty by providing the necessary 
legal authorities to respond (Benjamin et al., 2008). At the time of Hurricane Sandy, the 
Mid-Atlantic states had achieved varying levels of public health legal preparedness for 
catastrophic coastal storms. Implementing the following recommendations will enable 
policymakers to enhance their state’s preparedness for more severe, frequent natural 
disasters that threaten health security.  
 
Authority to Declare a Public Health Emergency 
 
Recommendation 1.1: All states should empower their governor and/or senior health 
official, in consultation with the state’s senior emergency management official, to declare 
a separate, distinct “health emergency.” This codified authority should specify the 
mechanism of declaration and any subsequent actions that can be taken to manage a 
health emergency once a declaration has been made. 
 
The absence of explicit laws and legal authorities may hinder response to public health 
emergencies. Lack of overt legal authority and responsibility may encumber the 
competence (i.e., the ability and skills necessary to understand and apply laws) of people 
who serve as agents of public health legal preparedness (Benjamin et al., 2008; Moulton 
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et al., 2003). If health officials are not overtly authorized to and delegated responsibility 
for managing public health emergencies, their role in a response may be unclear or 
delayed. For example, in Delaware officials may be unclear about who is responsible for 
declaring a public health emergency or how such a declaration can be made since the law 
does not specify this. Such confusion could lead to a delay in exercising this authority 
and in turn a delay in executing response operations. The ambiguity in state law may 
explain why Delaware has never proclaimed a health emergency (Rutkow, 2014). 
Moreover, in the absence of explicit responsibility for managing public health 
emergencies, public health agencies may not engage in or spearhead necessary and 
important preparedness activities. 
 
Recommendation 1.2: To mitigate redundancy and potential confusion from dual 
declarations, state laws should directly address what happens when both a general 
emergency declaration and a public health emergency declaration are issued. 
 
The potential for confusion and conflict exists when a general emergency (or disaster) 
and a health emergency are declared concurrently (Hodge & Anderson, 2008). However, 
explicitly codifying the authority to declare a health emergency will improve public 
health legal preparedness by establishing clear legal authority, fostering competence of 
the agents responsible for exercising this authority, and ensuring involvement of public 
health agencies. Therefore, to avoid potential confusion when dual declarations are issued, 
states should codify how processes differ when both a public health emergency and 
general emergency have been declared. 
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Recommendation 1.3: Given the potential for natural disasters to result in a significant 
excess of morbidity and mortality, all states should include natural disasters among the 
hazards for which a health emergency can be proclaimed. Ideally, states should define a 
“health emergency” as the occurrence or threat of all-hazards with a high probability of 
a large number of deaths and/or a large number of serious or long-term cases of 
disability. 
 
A broader definition of a “health emergency” may make dual declarations more likely to 
occur, but it may also enhance our ability to ensure national health security. Legislation 
can be difficult and time-consuming to enact. States may have little motivation to codify 
the authority to declare a public health emergency if they have not experienced a disaster 
in which their laws and legal authorities were perceived to be inadequate. States may also 
be reluctant to modify their definition of a health emergency, particularly if such an 
emergency has never been declared. However, these recommendations have the potential 
to enhance public health legal preparedness and ensure states are better able to respond to 
the challenges posed by climate change including more severe, frequent natural disasters 
like Hurricane Sandy, as well as other emergencies, which threaten health security. 
 
Authority to Order Evacuation 
 
Recommendation 2.1: All states should empower the government to order the evacuation 
of an area or a facility that is threatened (i.e., pre-event evacuation) or impacted by an 
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emergency if necessary in order to protect public health, welfare, or safety. The governor 
and/or a state’s senior emergency management official should be responsible for 
ordering general evacuation in consultation with the state’s senior public health and 
transportation officials. The governor and/or a state’s senior public health official should 
be responsible for ordering evacuation of a healthcare facility in consultation with senior 
emergency management, emergency medical service, and transportation officials. 
 
Given the increasing probability of coastal flooding due to climate change, to ensure 
health security and safety, it is increasingly important for state governments to be able to 
order evacuation of an endangered area (Melillo, Richmond, & Yohe, 2014). All states, 
which do not already authorize the government to order evacuation, should codify this 
authority. Additionally, given the vulnerability of patients and healthcare infrastructure, 
state governments should be able to order the evacuation of healthcare facilities 
specifically. 
 
Recommendation 2.2: Future research should examine whether explicit delegation of the 
authority to order evacuation (as opposed to possessing implicit authority under broad 
emergency powers) impacts the competence of agents responsible for executing this 
authority. 
 
New York explicitly authorizes a county or city to mandate evacuation of an area but 
only in the event of a civil attack (NY. Code Ann., 2013d). Though this is a vital public 
health power, it would not have been applicable in anticipation of Hurricane Sandy or 
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another natural disaster. Although neither New Jersey nor New York law explicitly 
authorizes the government to order area evacuation, the governor of each state (and the 
chief executive of a jurisdiction in New York or the emergency manager of a 
municipality in New Jersey) can order area evacuation under his or her broad emergency 
powers (NJ. Code Ann., 2013d; NY. Code Ann., 2013a). In advance of Hurricane Sandy, 
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg (2011) ordered the evacuation of Zone A 
under his broad authority to “promulgate local emergency orders to protect life and 
property or to bring the emergency situation under control” (NY. Code Ann., 2013a). 
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie also exercised this authority when he empowered the 
State Director of Emergency Management to order the evacuation of all persons from any 
area where their continued presence could present a danger to their health, safety, or 
welfare because of the conditions created by Hurricane Sandy (The State of NJ, 2012). 
Subsequently, the Barrier Islands, from Sandy Hook South to Cape May, and the Atlantic 
City casinos were placed under a mandatory evacuation order (Christie, 2011). Although 
it was not problematic in New York or New Jersey during Hurricane Sandy, lack of 
explicit authority to order evacuation may leave public officials unclear about their 
powers or their ability to apply the law in an emergency. In contrast, during Katrina, there 
was a delay in ordering the evacuation of New Orleans because Mayor Ray Nagin was 
unsure if he possessed the authority (Hurricane Katrina, 2006). Future research should 
study the impact of explicit authority (vs. implicit authority) on the competence of public 
officials charged with exercising said authority. 
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Recommendation 2.3: Given the regular turnover of government officials, emergency 
management agencies should have a repository of all emergency laws in their 
jurisdiction. Newly elected or appointed officials should be briefed on their legal 
authorities and possible responses to health emergencies in order to enhance their 
competence. Emergency plans should include draft orders (e.g., declarations of 
emergency and public health emergency, and evacuation and shelter- in-place orders) 
that can be edited and updated at the time of a disaster in order to expedite response.  
 
Mayor Ray Nagin’s delay in ordering the evacuation of New Orleans prior to Hurricane 
Katrina demonstrates not only that clear legal authorities and responsibilities are 
necessary for effective emergency response, but also that the individuals empowered 
need to be aware of their authority and how to exercise it (Hurricane Katrina, 2006). 
Public officials must be competent in their ability to apply the authorities vested in them. 
Developing information resources like the New Jersey Summary of Emergency 
Management Laws, Executive Orders and Legal Opinions in the New Jersey State 
Hazard Mitigation Plan,
 
or the New York State Public Health Legal Manual – A Guide 
for Judges, Attorneys and Public Health Professionals can facilitate improved 
competence, as well as assist these officials in applying the law during emergencies 




Recommendation 2.4: States and local governments should plan together in advance of 
disasters to determine how they will coordinate with one another during an event.  
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Overlapping state and local authority may hinder the ability to protect public health and 
safety by resulting in mixed messages. After Governor Christie ordered the mandatory 
evacuation of Atlantic City during Hurricane Sandy, the City’s Mayor Lorenzo Langford 
stated, “We want our residents to take every precaution to get out of town if they can. If 
they can’t or for whatever reason they won’t, then at least go to a shelter located in the 
city” (Baxter, 2012). Clear and consistent messaging is a tenet of effective risk 
communication; conflicting messages resulted in poor compliance with the gubernatorial 
order and many residents sheltering in Atlantic City and ultimately needing to be rescued 
(Baxter, 2012). Inconsistent laws across neighboring states may exacerbate these 
management and communication challenges when disasters cross local and state 
jurisdiction boundaries.
 
Although gubernatorial authority legally supersedes that of local 
public officials, it is important to consider in advance of a disaster how conflicting orders 
from multiple levels of government will be interpreted and implemented both by the 
government itself and by healthcare facilities. 
 
Authority to Order Shelter-in-Place 
 
Recommendation 3.1: All states should empower the government to order shelter-in-
place of an area or a facility that is threatened or impacted by an emergency if necessary 
in order to protect public health, welfare, or safety. The governor and/or a state’s senior 
emergency management official should be responsible for ordering shelter-in-place in 
consultation with the state’s senior public health official. The governor and/or a state’s 
senior public health official should be responsible for ordering shelter-in-place of a 
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healthcare facility in consultation with senior emergency management and emergency 
medical services. 
 
Sheltering-in-place may be necessary during an emergency to ensure safety, health, and 
welfare. For example, after the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, Massachusetts 
Governor Deval Patrick requested that Bostonians shelter-in-place while law enforcement 
officers were in pursuit of one of the bombing suspects. Bostonians submitted to this 
voluntary request, leaving the streets of Boston deserted (Salsberg, 2014). Whether this 
remarkable compliance was motivated by fear or the intense desire for officials to 
apprehend the suspect, the public may not be as willing to voluntarily shelter-in-place in 
different emergency circumstances. In contrast, when Baltimore Mayor Stephanie 
Rawlings-Blake issued a citywide curfew in response to rioting that occurred after 
Freddie Gray was injured and died in police custody in April 2015, the city struggled to 
achieve complete compliance and those who defied the curfew were arrested (Baltimore 
City, 2015; News Channel 8, The Associated Press, ABC News & ABC 7 News, 2015). 
To protect the public in instances of terrorism and civil unrest, as well as natural disasters 
and chemical or radiological accidents, it may be necessary for the government to 
mandate shelter-in-place. Explicitly codifying the authority to order shelter-in-place will 
improve public health legal preparedness. 
 
Recommendation 3.2: Future research should examine whether explicit delegation of the 
authority to order shelter-in-place (as opposed to possessing implicit authority under 
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broad emergency powers) impacts the competence of agents responsible for executing 
this authority. 
 
At the time of Hurricane Sandy, none of the four Mid-Atlantic states had explicitly 
authorized the government to order shelter-in-place. However, shelter-in-place could be 
mandated under broad emergency authorities. For example, in New Jersey after the 
emergency manager of a municipality proclaims a state of local disaster emergency, he or 
she is empowered to issue and enforce any order necessary to manage the emergency and 
protect the health, safety, and resources of residents of the municipality (NJ. Code Ann., 
2013c). Similarly, the chief executive of a jurisdiction in New York has broad law-
making authority, which could include issuing orders for the public to shelter-in-place if 
he or she deemed it necessary to protect life (NY. Code Ann., 2013a). Delaware, 
Maryland, and New York’s general emergency powers contain similar clauses that would 
enable the governor to mandate shelter-in-place (Del. Code Ann., 2013a; Md. Code Ann., 
Public Safety, 2013a; NJ. Code Ann., 2013e). However, lack of overt legal authority and 
responsibility to order shelter-in-place may encumber the competence (i.e., the ability and 
skills necessary to understand and apply laws) of people who serve as agents of public 
health legal preparedness. Therefore, future research should examine explicitly or 




Improving Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Decision-Making for Hospitals 
 
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, Dobalian et al. developed a conceptual model 
to study future healthcare facility evacuations and specifically to understand decision-
making processes of facility administrators (Figure 1). This conceptual model for 
understanding evacuation includes five components: community context, threat 
conditions, social processes, patterns of behavior, and consequences for preparedness 
(Dobalian, 2010). Community is the context in which a disaster occurs. The ability of a 
community to deal with a disaster is influenced by the resources it has, social linkages 
(i.e., how well community members and organizations are able to work together and prior 
collaboration), and its social climate (i.e., socio-economic, political, and psychological 
factors affecting community resources and linkages). The threat conditions created by a 
specific disaster are determined by characteristics of the disaster agent (e.g., size and 
duration of the hurricane); situational variables unique to a community (e.g., what day of 
the week and time a hurricane impacts a community); and the community’s belief about 
the disaster. Social processes – including communication, decision-making, coordination 
and task manifestation – arise from the interaction of the threat conditions with the 
community context. These social processes result in a pattern of behavior such as 
evacuation or shelter-in-place of the healthcare facility. Ultimately, the behavior 
implemented has consequences for preparedness for future disasters. This conceptual 
model provided context in which to examine the social process of decision-making and 




Key informants considered several factors in their determinations of whether to evacuate 
or shelter-in-place hospitals during Hurricane Sandy (Table 16). Community context 
factors they reported considering included the availability of supplies and personnel, as 
well as resources needed to execute evacuation such as transportation and beds at 
receiving hospital facilities. Decision-makers reported that concurrent hospital 
evacuations created competition and influenced the availability of resources for 
individual facilities. Hospital executives also identified cost and lost revenue as an 
influential factor in their decisions. Key informants considered several threat conditions 
created by Hurricane Sandy including those determined by characteristics of an agent 
(e.g., forecasted storm characteristics including track, size, wind speed, storm surge), 
situational variables (e.g., Monday timing of impact, hospital patient census and acuity), 
and hospital location and the ability to access it once the storm hit. Decision-makers also 
considered threat conditions that might arise as a result of the impact Hurricane Sandy 
including infrastructure damages, loss of power, and loss of other utilities. Hospital 
decision-makers reported considering the social process of mandates or orders (i.e., the 
lack thereof of an evacuation mandate or order from the government influenced their 
pattern of behavior). Prior experience – specifically Hurricane Irene the year prior in 
2011 – had consequences for preparedness (e.g., coastal storm zones in New York City 
were in the process of being redrawn, hospitals had hardened infrastructure since Irene). 
Prior experience also influenced the community’s belief about the significance of the 
threat from Hurricane Sandy. Lastly, risk of adverse health effects for patients from either 
evacuation or shelter-in-place was a significant factor in decision-making. Dobalian’s 
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conceptual model does not have a category that captures risk (i.e., the probability and 
severity) of adverse health effects. The most influential factors in evacuation and shelter-
in-place decision-making were risk of adverse health effects for patients, ability to 
maintain continuity of operations as dictated by threat conditions and prior experience.  
 
Recommendation 4.1: A category of “Risk” should be added to Dobalian’s Conceptual 
Model for Understanding Evacuation of Healthcare Facilities. 
 
While risk perception may be captured under threat conditions (the community’s belief 
about the disaster), the existing conceptual model for understanding evacuation of 
healthcare facilities does not capture threats resulting from patterns of behavior. Risk is 
influenced by the threat of the agent (from the storm itself), but also by the threat from 
the pattern of behavior, as well as the community context (e.g., threats resulting from 
evacuation itself). For healthcare facilities, which are responsible for ensuring the health 
and safety of their patients, it is particularly important to consider the risk of adverse 
health effects. Therefore, I propose modifying Dobalian’s Conceptual Model for 
Understanding Evacuation of Healthcare Facilities to improve its applicability. This 
conceptual model would be enhanced by the addition of a new category of risk, which 
would be defined as the probability and severity of adverse effects, in particular health 
effects (Figure 2). Risk would be the product of threat conditions and community context. 
There would also be a feedback loop from patterns of behavior.  
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Recommendation 4.2: Degree programs for healthcare executives should require 
candidates to complete training in emergency management. Professional organizations 
that credential or certify healthcare executives should require candidates to complete 
emergency management training as part of initial and re-certification processes.   
 
A key finding of this research was that hospital executives in the Mid-Atlantic region, 
consistent with those in other regions of the country, perceive themselves to have 
authority and responsibility for hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions (GAO, 
2006). However, this research also found a lack of engagement by hospital executives in 
emergency preparedness. Given their perceived authority and responsibility for 
evacuation and shelter-in-place decisions and the likelihood that hospital executives will 
make future facility-initiated evacuation decisions, more efforts should be made to 
prepare them for this role. Emergency management training should be required in degree 
programs intended to prepare people to be healthcare executives (e.g., master of health 
administration, master of business administration in healthcare). Additionally, 
organizations that credential hospital executives should require training in emergency 
management as part of initial and renewed certification. For example, the American 
College of Healthcare Executives could incorporate emergency preparedness training and 
experience into its credentialing requirements for fellowship and continuing education. 
  
Recommendation 4.3: Data on morbidity and mortality associated with pre- and post-
event evacuation versus sheltering-in-place of hospitals should be collected and analyzed 
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by public health officials. This data should then be communicated to all stakeholders 
involved in evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making for hospitals.  
 
This research revealed that risk to patients was a primary factor in the determination of 
whether to evacuate and shelter-in-place hospitals during Hurricane Sandy. Moreover, 
decision-makers reported that they thought hospitalized patients would be at risk of death 
or increased morbidity from the physical transportation and transfer of care. While 
studies in nursing homes have demonstrated that evacuation significantly exacerbates 
existing physical and mental health conditions of residents, similar data on the effects of 
hospital evacuation are lacking (Brown et al., 2012; Dosa et al., 2010).  Objective data 
about differential mortality and morbidity associated with evacuation (both before and 
after impact) versus shelter-in-place will enable decision-makers to more accurately 
assess risks. 
 
Recommendation 4.4: Hospitals should have independent third party engineers conduct 
facility assessments to identify vulnerabilities, opportunities for facility hardening, and 
thresholds or triggers for hospital evacuation. Hospitals should update their emergency 
plans based on the findings of these engineering assessments. 
 
Key informants in this research reported that a primary factor in the decision of whether 
to evacuate or shelter-in-place hospitals was the ability to maintain continuity of 
operations. However, most hospitals indicated that their plans lacked explicit, pre-defined 
criteria or triggers for evacuating. Hospitals that opted to shelter-in-place genuinely 
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thought they could sustain continuity of operations (COOP), although this was too often 
not the case. To enable hospitals to more accurately assess risks and their ability to 
sustain COOP, emergency plans must include facility-specific thresholds that would 
trigger protective actions including evacuation and shelter-in-place. Given that this 
research identified flooding as the primary determinant of hospital evacuation, hospital 
emergency plans should articulate thresholds for tolerable storm surge and other flooding 
in addition to wind speed that, if exceeded, would trigger evacuation. Additional facility 
vulnerabilities that could necessitate evacuation can be identified through professional 
engineering assessments. Such engineering assessments can also identify opportunities 
for facility hardening, which, if undertaken, may mitigate the need for evacuation in 
future emergencies. The results of these independent engineering assessments should be 
shared with government officials so they are aware of facility vulnerabilities and can 
better assist in decision-making. 
 
Recommendation 4.5: A risk index that integrates weather forecast data, morbidity and 
mortality data for evacuation and shelter-in-place of hospitals, and facility specific 
vulnerability data from engineering assessments should be created. Hospital executives, 
public health officials, and emergency management officials should use this dynamic 
index to inform evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making.  
 
This research revealed that during Hurricane Sandy decision-makers weighed the risk of 
evacuation – specifically, the potential for adverse health effects – against the potential 
for essential hospital services to fail while sheltering-in-place and the risk such 
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interruptions would pose to patients in order to determine whether to evacuate or shelter-
in-place hospitals. However, this study also revealed that decision-makers did not employ 
existing static decision-making tools to help them determine the likelihood that COOP 
would be interrupted by the storm. Additionally, data on the health effects of evacuation 
for hospital patients are lacking; consequently, decision-makers made determinations that 
evacuation posed adverse health effects based on experiences in a comparable population 
(nursing home patients) and their intuition. Comparative risk assessments that inform 
evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making can be improved by relying on new and 
existing objective data, as well as using decision-making tools, which can enable 
decision-makers to recognize harbingers of evacuation. A risk index that integrates 
existing available data, in particular local weather forecast data (e.g., storm surge 
forecasts), with new data on morbidity and mortality of evacuation and shelter-in-place of 
hospitals and results of facility engineer assessments would enable decision-makers to 
objectively assess and compare risks. While existing decision-making tools are often 
static and paper-based, ideally, such an index should be digital and dynamic in order to 






Recognizing that climate change is no longer a remote threat to be borne by future 
generations, on June 25, 2013, President Obama released his climate action plan. One of 
the three key pillars of this plan is preparing the U.S. for the impacts of global climate 
change. The plan asserts, “As we act to curb the greenhouse gas pollution that is driving 
climate change, we must also prepare for the impacts that are too late to avoid.” In an era 
of changing climate, where hurricanes are predicted to occur with more force and more 
frequency, there is an urgent need to ensure hospitals are prepared to safeguard patient 
safety and provide for continuous medical care.  
 
Given its duty to safeguard the public’s health, the government has a responsibility to 
ensure appropriate protective action is taken when impending disasters threaten or impair 
the ability of hospitals to sustain essential services. The law can enable the government to 
fulfill this duty by providing necessary authority to order preventive or reactive response 
when safety is imperiled. States can further improve their readiness for catastrophic 
disasters by ensuring the explicit authority to order evacuation and to order shelter-in-
place where it does not already exist. There is value in a single entity bearing ultimate 
responsibility for hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making.  
 
Evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making for hospitals can be further enhanced 
through improved risk assessment. To enable hospitals to more accurately assess risks 
and their ability to sustain continuity of operations, emergency plans must include 
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facility-specific thresholds that, if exceeded, would trigger protective actions including 
evacuation and shelter-in-place. Professional engineering hazard vulnerability 
assessments should be conducted to identify such triggers, as well as opportunities for 
mitigation. Hospitals’ emergency plans must explicitly detail decision-making processes, 
in particular how evacuation will be decided upon. Comparative risk assessments that 
inform decision-making would also be enhanced by improved collection, analysis, and 
communication of data on morbidity and mortality associated with both pre- and post-
evacuation versus sheltering-in-place of hospitals.  
 
Finally, evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making for hospitals can be improved 
by ensuring that those who are expected to make these difficult decisions are equipped to 
do so. The most senior decision-makers from hospitals and public health agencies should 
be trained in emergency management and practiced in using decision support tools and 
resources.  
 
By examining how public health officials and hospital administrators made evacuation 
and shelter-in-place decisions during Hurricane Sandy in 2012, this research contributes 
to our ability to ensure more resilient hospitals that are prepared for the health 
consequences of climate change. This research will enable public health and healthcare 
leaders to take important steps to improve public health legal preparedness for disasters 
and enhance evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making during future natural 





Table 1 – Federal Geographic Regions of the East Coast of the United States  
 Census Bureau
1 









Department of Health 
and Human Services 
Region 3: South,  


























Region 3: Mid-Atlantic 
 
Southern New Jersey 
Delaware 
Pennsylvania 













Region 1: Northeast,  






Region 2: Northeast & Caribbean 
 
New York   
New Jersey 
Puerto Rico 
US Virgin Islands 
 
*Excludes the areas of Maryland and Virginia that directly surround Washington, DC, which is part of the National Capital Region.  
(Census Bureau, n.d.; EPA, n.d.; FEMA, 2015; GSA, n.d.; HHS, 2014; NOAA, n.d.) 
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Table 2 – Tropical Cyclone Classifications 
Classification  Tropical Cyclone’s Maximum Sustained Surface Wind Speed 
Tropical Depression 38 mph (33 knots) or less 
Tropical Storm 39 to 73 mph (34 to 63 knots) 
Hurricane 74 mph (64 knots) or higher 
Major Hurricane 111 mph (96 knots) or higher* 






Table 3 – Tropical Storm Terminology 
Term  Definition 
Cyclone A rotating, organized system of clouds and thunderstorms 
with closed-circulation. Also the term used to describe what 
are known as hurricanes (see below) in the U.S that occur in 
the Indian Ocean and South Pacific Ocean.  
Tropical Cyclone Cyclone originating in tropical or sub-tropical water. 
Tropical cyclones rotate counter-clockwise in the Northern 
Hemisphere and clockwise in the Southern Hemisphere. 
Tropical cyclones include tropical depressions, tropical 
storms and hurricanes. 
Hurricane Term used to describe a tropical cyclone with sustained 
wind speeds equal to or greater than 74 mph (64 kt) that 
occurs east of the International Dateline to the Greenwich 
Meridian. 
Typhoon A synonym for hurricane or cyclone. This term is used 
north of the Equator west of the International Dateline. 
Atlantic Hurricane Hurricane originating in the Atlantic Basin, which includes 
the Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico. 
Superstorm Hurricane Sandy was nicknamed “Superstorm Sandy.” It 
was anticipated that Sandy would be a devastating storm 
because of its unusual right-to-left pathway and its intact 
core.  
(AOML, n.d.; Nolan, 2012)   
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Table 4 – Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale 
Category Wind Speed Damage Due to Winds 
I 74-95 mph 
64-82 kt 
119-153 km/h 
Very dangerous winds will produce 
some damage 
II 96-110 mph 
83-95 kt 
154-177 km/h 
Extremely dangerous winds will cause 
extensive damage 
III 111-129 mph 
96-112 kt 
178-208 km/h 
Devastating damage will occur 
IV 130-156 mph 
113-136 kt 
209-251 km/h 
Catastrophic damage will occur 
V 157 mph or higher 
137 kt or higher 
252 km/h or higher 
Catastrophic damage will occur 




Table 5 – Aim 1 Query Results 
 
Total Number of Laws Produced by Each Search Query, Number of Laws Excluded, and Number 
of Laws from which Data Were Abstracted 
 
 
Search 1: Authority to Declare an Emergency 
 Query Results Laws Excluded Data Abstracted 
DE Statutes 100 92 8 
DE Regulations 34 34 0 
MD Statutes 158 149 9 
MD Regulations 54 54 0 
NJ Statutes 158 151 7 
NJ Regulations 116 116 0 
NY Statutes 221 213 8 
NY Regulations 472 472 0 
 
 
Search 2: Authority to Declare a Health Emergency 
 Query Results Laws Excluded Data Abstracted 
DE Statutes 14 11 3 
DE Regulations 6 5 1 
MD Statutes 21 16 5 
MD Regulations 15 15 0 
NJ Statutes 28 25 3 
NJ Regulations 25 22 3 
NY Statutes 10 10 0 
NY Regulations 10 10 0 
 
 
Search 3: Authority to Order Evacuation or Shelter-in-Place 
 Query Results Laws Excluded Data Abstracted 
DE Statutes 87 83 4 
DE Regulations 70 61 9 
MD Statutes 173 167 6 
MD Regulations 323 282 41 
NJ Statutes 251 235 16 
NJ Regulations 563 527 36 
NY Statutes 238 230 8 




Table 6 – State Definitions of Disaster, Emergency, and Health Emergency 
 
State Definition of Disaster or Emergency Definition of Health Emergency 
DE “‘Disaster’ means a catastrophic condition caused by a man-made event 
(including, but not limited to, industrial, nuclear or transportation 
accident, explosion, conflagration, power failure, act of domestic 
terrorism, natural resource shortage or other condition resulting from 
man-made causes, such as hazardous materials spills and other injurious 
environmental contamination), natural event (including, but not limited 
to, any hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, 
tidal wave, earthquake, landslide, mud slide, snowstorm, drought, fire or 
explosion) or war-caused event (following an attack upon the United 
States caused by use of bombs, missiles, shellfire or nuclear, 
radiological, chemical or biological means, or other weapons, or overt 
paramilitary actions, or other conditions such as sabotage) which results 
in substantial damage to property or the environment, and/or hardship, 
suffering, injury or possible loss of life.”  
 
“‘Emergency’ means any situation which requires efforts and 
capabilities to save lives or to protect property, public health and safety, 
or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster in Delaware.” 20 Del. C. § 
3102 
“A "public health emergency" is an occurrence or 
imminent threat of an illness or health condition that: 
a. Is believed to be caused by any of the following: 
1. Bioterrorism; 2. The appearance of a novel or previously 
controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological 
toxin; or 3. A chemical attack or accidental release; and b. 
Poses a high probability of any of the following harms: 1. 
A large number of deaths in the affected population; 2. A 
large number of serious or long-term disabilities in the 
affected population; or 3. Widespread exposure to an 
infectious or toxic agent.” 20 Del. C. § 3132 
MD “‘Emergency’ means the threat or occurrence of: (1) a hurricane, 
tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, 
earthquake, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, drought, fire, explosion, 
and any other disaster in any part of the State that requires State 
assistance to supplement local efforts in order to save lives and protect 
public health and safety; or (2) an enemy attack, act of terrorism, or 
public health catastrophe.” Md. PUBLIC SAFETY Code Ann. § 14-
101 
“‘Catastrophic health emergency’ means a situation in 
which extensive loss of life or serious disability is 
threatened imminently because of exposure to a deadly 
agent.” 
 
“‘Deadly agent’ means: (1) anthrax, ebola, plague, 
smallpox, tularemia, or other bacterial, fungal, rickettsial, 
or viral agent, biological toxin, or other biological agent 
capable of causing extensive loss of life or serious 
disability; (2) mustard gas, nerve gas, or other chemical 
agent capable of causing extensive loss of life or serious 
disability; or (3) radiation at levels capable of causing 
extensive loss of life or serious disability.” Md. PUBLIC 
SAFETY Code Ann. § 14-3A-01 
NJ “‘Emergency’ means any flood, hurricane, storm, tornado, high water, 
wind-driven water, tidal wave, drought, fire, explosion, civil disorder or 
other catastrophe which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and 
magnitude to substantially endanger the health, safety and property of 
the citizens of this State.” N.J. Stat. § 52:14E-3 
"Public health emergency" means an occurrence or 
imminent threat of an occurrence that: a. is caused or is 
reasonably believed to be caused by any of the following: 
(1) bioterrorism or an accidental release of one or more 
biological agents; (2) the appearance of a novel or 
previously controlled or eradicated biological agent; (3) a 
natural disaster; (4) a chemical attack or accidental release 
of toxic chemicals; or (5) a nuclear attack or nuclear 
accident; and b. poses a high probability of any of the 
following harms: (1) a large number of deaths, illness, or 
injury in the affected population; (2) a large number of 
serious or long-term impairments in the affected 
population; or (3) exposure to a biological agent or 
chemical that poses a significant risk of substantial future 
harm to a large number of people in the affected 
population. N.J. Stat. § 26:13-2 
NY “‘Disaster" means occurrence or imminent threat of wide spread or 
severe damage, injury, or loss of life or property resulting from any 
natural or man-made causes, including, but not limited to, fire, flood, 
earthquake, hurricane, tornado, high water, landslide, mudslide, wind, 
storm, wave action, volcanic activity, epidemic, air contamination, 
terrorism, cyber event, blight, drought, infestation, explosion, 
radiological accident, nuclear, chemical, biological, or bacteriological 
release, water contamination, bridge failure or bridge collapse. 
 
“ ‘State disaster emergency’ means a period beginning with a 
declaration by the governor that a disaster exists and ending upon the 
termination thereof.” NY CLS Exec § 20 
Not Applicable – Not defined in NY statutes or regulations. 
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Table 7 – State Emergency Authorities Relevant to Hospital Evacuation 
 
Mid-Atlantic state laws pertaining to emergency declarations, health emergency declarations, and evacuation orders 
 
State Authority to Declare an Emergency Authority to Declare a Health Emergency Authority to Order Evacuation 
DE 
  
20 Del. C. § 3115 20 Del. C. § 3132* 16 Del. C. § 508 
    20 Del. C. § 3116 
MD 
  
Md. Public Safety Code Ann. § 14-107  Md. Public Safety Code Ann. § 14-3A-02 Md. Public Safety Code Ann. § 14-107 




N.J. Stat. § App. A:9-51  N.J. Stat. § 26:13-3Â N.J. Stat. § 26:13-8 
   N.J.A.C. 10:161B-2.21 
  N.J.A.C. 8:43E-3.8 
NY 
  
NY CLS Exec § 28   NY CLS Exec § 24 
   NY CLS Unconsol Ch 131, § 25 
 
*  Although Delaware does not explicitly allocate the authority to declare a health emergency, 20 Del. C. § 3132 defines "public health 
emergency." It states, "A "public health emergency" is an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that: a. Is 
believed to be caused by any of the following: 1. Bioterrorism; 2. The appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated 
infectious agent or biological toxin; or 3. A chemical attack or accidental release; and b. Poses a high probability of any of the following 
harms: 1. A large number of deaths in the affected population; 2. A large number of serious or long-term disabilities in the affected 
population; or 3. Widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large 
number of people in the affected population.”  
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Table 8 – Emergency Declarations  
 
Emergency declaration authorities in Mid-Atlantic states: who can declare an emergency, how, when and why?  
 
State Law What is Declared? Mechanism of 
Declaration 
Authorized Party Threshold for Declaration Required Content of Declaration Notification 
Requirements 
Period of Effect 
Limit 
Termination and Renewal 
Conditions 
DE 20 Del. C. § 3115  "state of emergency" Proclamation Governor Emergency or disaster has 
occurred or is imminent 
 Conditions giving rise to 
declaration or conditions that 
would make a termination of the 
state of emergency possible;  
 Area(s) affected or threatened by 
disaster;  
 Description (nature) of disaster 
N/A 30 days State of emergency continues 
until Governor finds threat 
has passed or emergency has 
been dealt with to the extent 
that conditions necessitating a 
state of emergency no longer 
exist and terminates the state 
of emergency by subsequent 
order. No state of emergency 
can continue for more than 30 
days without being renewed 
by the Governor. Termination 
order shall specify the 
reasons for its termination 
and shall be promptly 
disseminated to the public. 
MD Md. Public Safety 
Code Ann. § 14-107; 
Md. Public Safety 
Code Ann. § 14-303 
"state of emergency" Executive order or 
proclamation 
Governor Emergency has occurred or 
is impending due to any 
cause; at the request of the 
Secretary of State Police or 
the chief executive of a 
county or municipal 
corporation, or on Governor's 
own initiative if public safety 
is threatened 
 Conditions giving rise to 
declaration or conditions that 
would make a termination of the 
state of emergency possible;  
 Area(s) affected or threatened by 
disaster;  
 Description (nature) of disaster 
Must be 
disseminated 
promptly by means 
calculated to 
publicize its contents 
and filed with 
MEMA, the State 
Archives, and the 
chief local records-
keeping agency in 
the affected area 
30 days State of emergency continues 
until Governor finds threat 
has passed or emergency has 
been dealt with to the extent 
that emergency conditions no 
longer exist and terminates 
the state of emergency by 
executive order or 
proclamation. State of 
emergency may not continue 
for longer than 30 days unless 
renewed by Governor. 
General Assembly may 
terminate a state of 
emergency at any time by 
joint resolution.  
NJ N.J. Stat. § App. 
A:9-51 
"emergency" Proclamation Governor Whenever, in Governor's 
opinion, the control of any 
disaster is beyond the 
capabilities of local 
authorities 
Nothing specified N/A No limit State of emergency continues 
until Governor determines 
emergency has passed and 
issues a proclamation 
declaring its end. 
NY NY CLS Exec § 28 "disaster emergency" Executive order Governor At request of a chief 
executive or whenever the 
Governor finds that a disaster 
has occurred or is imminent 
for which local governments 
are unable to respond 
adequately 
 Area(s) affected or threatened by 
disaster;  
 Description (nature) of disaster 
For radiological 
accidents, governor 





notify the public 
6 months Remains in effect for a period 
not to exceed six months or 
until rescinded by the 
governor, whichever occurs 
first. The governor may issue 
additional orders to extend 
the state disaster emergency 
for additional periods also not 




Table 9 – Health Emergency Declarations 
 
Health emergency declarations in Mid-Atlantic states: who can declare a health emergency, how, when and why? 
 
State Law What is 
Declared? 
















MD Md. Public Safety 




A situation in which 
extensive loss of life or 
serious disability is 
threatened imminently 
because of exposure to a 
deadly agent, where deadly 
agent means: anthrax, 
ebola, plague, smallpox, 
tularemia, or other 
bacterial, fungal, 
rickettsial, or viral agent, 
biological toxin, or other 
biological agent capable of 
causing extensive loss of 
life or serious disability; or 
mustard gas, nerve gas, or 
other chemical agent 
capable of causing 
extensive loss of life or 
serious disability; or 
radiation at levels capable 
of causing extensive loss 
of life or serious disability. 
Proclamation Governor If the Governor 
determines that a 
health emergency 
exists 
 Conditions giving rise to 
declaration;  
 Description (nature) of health 
emergency;  
 Area(s) affected or threatened 
by health emergency 









30 days after 
issuance. The 
Governor may renew 
the proclamation for 
successive periods, 
each not to exceed 30 
days, if the he/she 




NJ N.J. Stat. § 26:13-3 "public health 
emergency" 
Occurrence or imminent 
threat that is caused by:  
 bioterrorism or accidental 
release of biological agent; 
 novel or previously 
controlled or eradicated 
biological agent; 
 natural disaster;  
 chemical attack or 
accidental release of toxic 
chemicals; or 
 nuclear attack or nuclear 
accident; and poses a high 
probability of 
 large number of deaths, 
illness, or injury in the 
affected population; 
large number of serious or 
long-term impairments in 
the affected population; or   
 exposure to a biological 
agent or chemical that 
poses a significant risk of 
substantial future harm to a 
large number of people in 
the affected population. 
Executive order Governor Governor, in 
consultation with the 
commissioner and 
the Director of the 
State Office of 
Emergency 
Management, may 
declare a health 
emergency. 
 Conditions giving rise to 
declaration;  
 Description (nature) of health 
emergency;  
 Geographic areas covered by 
declaration;  
 Expected duration (if less than 
30 days);  
 May also prescribe necessary 
actions or countermeasures to 
protect the public's health. 
 Commissioner must 
notify elected 
municipal officials 
and health care 
facilities in 
jurisdiction of the 
nature and extent of 
the emergency 
 Commissioner of 
Health and Senior 
Services must notify 





plants, or crops. 
30 days Terminates 
automatically after 
30 days unless 
renewed by the 
Governor under the 
same standards and 




Table 10 – Evacuation Authorities 
 
Evacuation authorities in Mid-Atlantic states: what can be evacuated, when, and by whom? 
 
State Law Allocating Authority to Evacuate Who can order evacuation? What can be evacuated? When can evacuation be ordered?  
Delaware 16 Del. C. § 508 The Division of Public Health A facility If the facility may seriously endanger 
public health. 
20 Del. C. § 3116 Governor All or part of the population 
from a stricken or threatened 
area within the State. 
If this evacuation is necessary for the 
preservation of life. 
Maryland Md. PUBLIC SAFETY Code Ann. § 14-107 Governor All or part of the population 
from a stricken or threatened 
area in the State. 
If necessary in order to protect the 
public health, welfare, or safety. 
Md. PUBLIC SAFETY Code Ann. § 14-3A-03 Governor Any facility After proclaiming a catastrophic health 
emergency . 
New Jersey N.J. Stat. § 26:13-8 Commissioner of Department 
of Health 
Any facility During a health emergency, when there 
is reasonable cause to believe that a 
facility may endanger the public health. 
N.J.A.C. 10:161B-2.21 Commissioner of Department 
of Human Services 
Substance abuse treatment 
facility 
Upon a finding that violations 
pertaining to the care of clients or 
because of hazardous or unsafe 
conditions of the physical structure 
pose an immediate threat to the health, 
safety, and welfare of the public or the 
clients of the facility. 
N.J.A.C. 8:43E-3.8 Commissioner of Department 
of Health 
Health care facility Upon a finding that violations 
pertaining to the care of patients or to 
the hazardous or unsafe conditions of 
the physical structure pose an 
immediate threat to the health, safety, 
and welfare of the public or the 
residents of the facility. 
New York NY CLS Exec § 24 Chief executive of any county, 
city, town, or village 
Anything within the territorial 
limits of a county, city, town or 
village. 
Upon a finding by the chief executive 
that public safety is imperiled; after a 
local state of emergency has been 
proclaimed. 
NY CLS Unconsol Ch 131, § 25 A county or city  Any person In the event or in anticipation of attack. 
* Abbreviations: Delaware Code (Del. C.); Annotated (Ann.); Statute (Stat.); New Jersey Administrative Code (N.J.A.C.); and Consolidated Laws (CLS).  
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Table 11 – Key Informant Recruitment, Response, and Participation 
 
Response Rate Interviewees (n) 
Total Contacted 61 
Less Excluded (Did not meet inclusion criteria) 11 
Total Recruited 50 
Total Interviewed* 42 
Declined 2 
No response 4 
Willing to participate, unable to schedule 2 










Table 12 – Organizations and Key Informants by Sector, State, and Location of Interview 
 
 Organizations Interviewed (n=32) Individuals Interviewed (n=42) 
Sector # % # % 
Hospitals and Associations 16 50% 21 50% 
Hospital 15 47% 19 45% 
Hospital Association 1 3% 2 5% 
Government 16 50% 21 50% 
Public Health 8 25% 11 26% 
Emergency Management 6 19% 7 17% 
Emergency Medical Services 2 6% 3 7% 
Total 32 100% 42 100% 
State # % # % 
Delaware 4 13% 5 12% 
Maryland 10 31% 12 29% 
New York 10 31% 12 29% 
New Jersey 8 25% 13 31% 
Total 32 100% 42 100% 
Interview Location # % # % 
In-person 25 78% 33 79% 
Phone 6 19% 8 19% 
Email 1 3% 1 2% 
Total 32 100% 42 100% 
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Table 13 – Key Informant Organizations by Sector and State 
 
 Sector Delaware Maryland New Jersey New York 
 Hospital   Beebe Healthcare 
 Nemours 
 Shore Regional Health  
 Garrett County Memorial 
Hospital 
 McCready Foundation 
 AtlantiCare Regional 
Medical Center  
 Hoboken University 
Medical Center 
(CarePoint) 
 Jersey City Medical 
Center (Barnabas 
Health) 
 Palisades Medical 
Center 
 
 Bellevue Hospital 
 New York Presbyterian 
Lower Manhattan Division 
 New York Veterans 
Administration (VA) 
Harbor Healthcare System 
 New York University 
Langone Medical Center 
 Richmond University 
Medical Center 
 Staten Island University 
Hospital 










Public Health  Delaware Division of 
Public Health§§§§§ 
 Maryland Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene 
 Dorchester County Health 
Department 
 Garrett County Health 
Department 
 Somerset County Health 
Department 
 New Jersey Department 
of Health 
 New York State 
Department of Health 
 New York City 
Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene 
 
Emergency Management   New Castle Emergency 
Management 
 Maryland Emergency 
Management Agency 
 Somerset County Department 
of Emergency Services 
 Atlantic County 
Department of Public 
Safety  
 Hudson County Office 
of Emergency 
Management 
 New York City Office of 
Emergency Management 
Emergency Medical Services   Maryland Institute of 
Emergency Medical Services 




                                                             
§§§§§ Written statement provided; No interview conducted  
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Table 14 – Characteristics of Interviewees’ Hospitals 
 
State 
New York Hospitals 6 
New Jersey Hospitals 4 
Maryland Hospital 3 
Delaware Hospitals 2 
Evacuation Status for Hurricane Sandy 
Pre-event Evacuation 3 
Post-event Evacuation 3 
Shelter-in-Place 9 




Table 15 – Primary Determinants of Acute Care Hospital Evacuation During Hurricane Sandy as Reported by Decision-
Makers 
 
Hospital Type of Evacuation Determinant 
Hospital A Pre-impact evacuation*  Planned Utility Outages (Steam, Electric): Utility company proactively turned off steam service and 
underground electric grid supplying hospital to prevent damage from flooding and saltwater intrusion and 
enable quicker restoration of service post-storm. 
Hospital B Pre-impact evacuation*  Prior Experience: Institutional memory of a 1992 nor’easter storm during a full moon, its impact on the 
facility, and similarity to circumstances during Hurricane Sandy (arrival of storm coinciding with high 
tide). 
Hospital C Pre-impact evacuation*  Anticipated Utility Outage (Electric) and Flooding: Anticipated flooding and subsequent damage to 
electrical switchgear, which was located below expected storm surge level. 
Hospital D Post-impact evacuation
+
 Sustained Utility Outages (Sewage and Power) and Flooding: Primary power from electrical grid was lost 
due to an explosion of a transformer at power company substation. Loss of water pressure and functional 
sewage systems prompted evacuation. Also, flooding of basement resulted in damage to fuel pump 
supplying generator. Full power loss was imminent. 
Hospital E Post-impact evacuation
+
 Sustained Utility Outage (Power) and Flooding: Primary power from electrical grid was lost due to an 
explosion of a transformer at power company substation. Storm surge flooding resulted in failure of back up 
electrical systems (specifically fuel pumps). 
Hospital F Post-impact evacuation
+
 Sustained Utility Outage (Power) and Flooding: Failure of primary and secondary (external) backup 
generators that became damp and shorted out, as well as facility flooding.  
* Pre-impact evacuations were anticipatory evacuations that occurred prior to Hurricane Sandy’s arrival.  
+
 Post-impact evacuations were reactive evacuations that occurred after facilities sustained damage. Reactive evacuations occurred either while the 
storm was ongoing or in its immediate aftermath.  
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Table 16  – Factors Considered in Hospital Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place 




Variable Variable Description 
Threat Conditions Weather forecast Predicted weather including storm track, size, 
wind speed (Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Category), 
and storm surge. 
Threat Conditions Weather conditions Current and future weather conditions – i.e., 
conditions under which hospital would have to 
continue to operate or evacuate (e.g., high tide, 
nor’easter that occurred after Sandy) 
Threat Conditions Flooding/Storm surge Flooding or storm surge that is anticipated or has 
occurred. History of flooding. 
Threat Conditions Timing When storm is expected to impact area (e.g., 
weekend, nighttime, high tide)?  
Threat Conditions Facility location and 
access 
Where is the facility located? Is it in a flood plane 
or evacuation zone? Is it in close proximity to 
water? Will access to facility be limited or 
completely cut off by the storm (e.g., do you have 
to cross a bridge that will be flooded to get to 
hospital)? 
Threat Conditions Infrastructure 
vulnerability and 
hardening 
Ability to resist physical threats (wind, flooding). 
How old is facility? What mitigation has been 
done to limit impacts of a storm on facility (e.g., 
installation of submarine doors or hurricane grade 
windows)?  
Threat Conditions Utilities Are or will essential utilities be impacted by the 
storm? Are service disruptions planned or 
anticipated? Essential utilities considered 
included: electricity, steam, gas, potable water, 
sewage, HVAC, and fire protection. 
Threat Conditions Electricity/Power Specific consideration given to electricity. Has 
electricity been interrupted or are disruptions 
anticipated? Where are the generator(s), 
switchgear and fuel pump located? Is damage to 
any part of the primary or backup electrical system 
anticipated or has it occurred? Is their adequate 
fuel to operate backup generators?  
Threat Conditions Infrastructure damage Has physical destruction to the plant occurred or is 
it anticipated (e.g., flooding, shorting of 
switchgear)?  
Threat Conditions Patient census and 
acuity 
Number, type (e.g., psychiatric, trauma, other 
specialty care) and severity of patients in hospital; 
Ability of hospital to safely decant the census or 
discharge patients (i.e., do patients live in flood 






Variable Variable Description 
Community 
Context 
Supplies Does facility have adequate inventory of essential 
supplies (e.g., food, linens, medications, oxygen, 
fuel, and heating oil)? Are disruptions to future 
supply deliveries anticipated?  
Community 
Context 




Cost What is the financial cost associated with 
evacuation and repatriation? Who will bear this 
cost? Who has assumed the cost of past 
evacuations? Has disaster declaration been issued 
and is there potential government subsidy? 
Community 
Context 
Resource availability Are other healthcare facility evacuations occurring 
simultaneously? Is there competition for logistical 
support or resources to execute evacuation? 
Community 
Context 
Transportation Availability of ambulances or other vehicles (e.g., 
medical ambulance buses) to transport patients 




Receiving facilities Receiving facilities with the ability to treat patient 
mix including unique patient populations (e.g., 
prisoners, psychiatric patients, patients requiring 
isolation); Availability of and competition for beds 
at these receiving hospitals. 
Community 
Context 
Community reliance Expectation that hospital will be a community 
resource during and after the storm. What other 
healthcare resources are in the area (e.g., is this the 
only hospital in county)? Are there other acute 
care hospitals that patients can seek care at in the 
aftermath of storm?  
Risk Continuity of patient 
care 
Ability to provide adequate, uninterrupted 
standards of care 
Risk Risk to patients Potential for morbidity and mortality resulting 
specifically from evacuating or sheltering-in-
place; Patient safety 
Risk Employee health and 
safety 
Potential for occupational injury/illness from 
evacuation or sheltering-in-place 
Social process Evacuation 
order/mandate 
Has government mandated or ordered hospital 
evacuation? 
Patterns of behavior Internal evacuation Ability to relocate patients internally (horizontally 
or vertically) within hospital 
Consequences for 
Preparedness 
Prior experience Decision-maker or organization’s previous 
experience with disasters and specifically 




Hurricane Irene A subset of prior experience; Specifically, did 
hospital(s) evacuate year prior for Hurricane 
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Figure 2 – McGinty’s Conceptual Model for Understanding Evacuation of Healthcare Facilities 
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Supplemental Materials 
Appendix 1 – Study Protocol 
Aim: To systematically identify and characterize state-level laws in existence in 
Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York at the time Hurricane Sandy occurred 
for the following areas within emergency preparedness: 
1. Authority to declare an emergency
2. Authority to declare a health emergency
3. Authority to order evacuation or shelter-in-place
Data Collection 
1. Search for and collected laws regarding the above areas of emergency
preparedness by:
a. Running searches in LexisNexis State Capital of Delaware, Maryland,
New Jersey, and New York statutory and administrative codes:
i. Search terms for power to declare an emergency: (disaster OR
emergency) AND (governor)
ii. Search terms for power to declare a health emergency: (health
emergency OR health disaster)
iii. Search terms for power to order evacuation or shelter-in-place:
(shelter! OR evacuat!)
******
Note: Search terms were developed through an iterative process and in consultation with 
members of my thesis advisory committee. “Pilot” keywords, which were based on a 
priori knowledge, included: emergency, disaster, public health emergency, health 
emergency, evacuation, shelter and sheltering-in-place. Selection of final search string 
required balancing the need to ensure search term was successful in locating record(s) 
that address the powers of interest and minimizing the number of query results returned 
(i.e., to avoid unwieldy number of search results). 
2. Review query results in each category for laws related to the three
abovementioned areas of interest within emergency preparedness.
3. Apply the following exclusion criteria:
a. Executive orders, which are codified in some states, were excluded
because they themselves do not confer authority but rather are examples of
the exercise of authority granted by statute or regulation;
b. Laws in which the keyword had a meaning unrelated to emergency
preparedness were excluded (e.g., homeless shelters);
c. Laws pertaining to the evacuation of vehicles (e.g., trains) or rides (e.g.,
fun houses) were excluded;
******
 Note: In order to retrieve variations of search terms, I used wildcard symbols. I used an exclamation 
mark (!) as a truncation, which replaced more than one letter at the end of a search term (e.g., evacuat! to 
locate records containing evacuate and evacuation and shelter! to locate records containing shelter and 
sheltering). 
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d. Laws addressing only fire-related evacuation were excluded;
e. Laws addressing only casino emergencies were excluded.
4. Downloading laws into folders (one for each of the 3 authorities of interest) and
subfolders (state and statute or regulation).




After completing all searches, I compared laws identified for inclusion to publically 
available data sets of emergency health powers from the Network for Public Health Law 
and the Johns Hopkins Center for Law and the Public’s Health (Center for Law and the 
Public’s Health, 2013; NPHL, 2012). When a discrepancy arose, it was resolved by 
consulting the law’s text and through discussion with my thesis advisory committee. 
Duplicate laws were removed. 
Data Analysis 
1. I developed three electronic data extraction forms (one for each of the three
emergency authorities of interest) in Qualtrics (Provo, UT, USA), an online
survey and data collection program. The Association of State and Territorial
Health Officers (ASTHO) Emergency Declarations & Authorities–State Analysis
Guide (2011), as well as the study’s research questions, informed the
development of the fields in each data extraction form.
2. I used these forms to abstract information from the full text of the statutes and
regulations previously determined to be relevant for each of the authorities of
interest.
3. I downloaded an Excel spreadsheet of all abstracted data.
4. I reviewed abstracted data to characterize the legal context that existed in
Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York at the time of Hurricane Sandy.
††††††
 This date was selected because on Monday, October 22, 2012, the National Weather Service of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration issued a public advisory declaring that Tropical 
Depression 18 had officially become Tropical Storm Sandy (i.e., when it became a named storm). 
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Appendix 2 – Data Abstraction Form 1 
Authority to Declare an Emergency 





 Delaware (1) 
 Maryland (2) 
 New Jersey (3) 
 New York (4) 
Q3 Is this document a statute or regulation? 
 Statute (1) 
 Regulation (2) 
 Executive Order (3) 
 Other (4) ____________________ 
Q4 Document number (e.g., Md. PUBLIC SAFETY Code Ann. § 14-107) 
Q5 What is the subject of this document (e.g., § 14-107. State of Emergency -- Declaration by 
Governor)? 
Q6 Was law in effect during Hurricane Sandy? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Q7 Does this law grant the authority to declare an emergency/disaster? 
 Yes (If yes, what term is used?) (1) ____________________ 
 No (2) 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Block 
Q8 Under this law, by what mechanism is an emergency declared (e.g., proclamation, executive 
order, etc.)? 
Q9 Under this law, to whom is the authority to declare an emergency/disaster granted (i.e., what 
officer is granted authority)? 
 Governor (1)
 Other (4) ____________________
Q10 According to this law, what is this officer responsible for? 
Q11 Per this law, under what conditions can this officer declare an emergency/disaster (i.e., upon 
finding...what is the threshold that must be met in order for an emergency/disaster to be 
declared)? 
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Q12 Under this law, what MUST declaration address? 
 Description (nature) of disaster (10) 
 Conditions giving rise to declaration (4) 
 Area(s) affected or threatened by disaster (9) 
 Effective dates of declaration (1) 
 Geographic areas covered by declaration (3) 
 Agencies responsible for overseeing response (5) 
 Rules or regulations waived or suspended (6) 
 Nothing specified (7) 
 Other (8) ____________________ 
 
Q13 Does the law include requirements for notification regarding or dissemination of an 
emergency/disaster declaration? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does the law include requirements for notification regarding or dissemination 
of an emergency/disaster declaration? Yes Is Selected 
Q14 What are the requirements for publicizing or disseminating an emergency/disaster 
declaration (i.e., to whom must notification be made, through what mechanism, when, etc.)? 
 
Q15 Under this law, for what period of time does a declaration of emergency/disaster remain in 
effect? What are the limits on how long the state of emergency may continue? 
 
Q16 Does law specify terms of termination? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does law specify terms of termination? Yes Is Selected 
Q17 What does the law say about termination of a state of emergency/disaster? 
 
Q18 Does law specify terms of renewal or extension (i.e., approval required to extend state of 
emergency)? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does law specify terms of renewal or extension (i.e., approval required to 
extend state of emergency)? Yes Is Selected 
Q19 What does the law say about renewal or extension of a state of emergency/disaster? 
 
Q20 Does this law authorize the Governor or another state officer to make additional resources 
available (e.g., funds from rainy day fund)? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does this law authorize the Governor or another state officer to make 
additional resources available (e.g., funds from rainy day fund)? Yes Is Selected 
Q21 What additional resources may be made available in a state of emergency? 
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Q22 Does this law authorize the Governor or another state officer to take any other action besides 
declaring an emergency (e.g., assume control of all emergency operations, request federal 
assistance, etc.)? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does this law authorize officer to take any other action besides declaring an 
emergency (e.g., assume control of all emergency operations, request federal assistance, 
etc.)? Yes Is Selected 
Q23 What additional action is the officer authorized to take? 
 
Answer If Does this document grant the authority to declare an emergency/disaster? No 
Is Selected 
Q24 Does this document directly relate to the declaration of emergency or disaster (e.g., 
definitions, purpose, etc.)? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If To what does this law pertain? Legislative intent, purpose or policy Is Selected 
Q25 To what does this law pertain?  
 Legislative intent, purpose or policy (1) 
 Definitions (2) 
 Other emergency powers (besides declaration) (3) 
 Other (4) ____________________ 
 
Answer If Does this law grant the authority to declare an emergency/disaster? No Is 
Selected 
Q26 What does this law address? (in my own words, provide a short description) 
 
Answer If Does this law grant the authority to declare an emergency/disaster? No Is 
Selected 
Q27 What does this law address? (provide quoted text) 
 




Appendix 3 – Data Abstraction Form 2  
 
Authority to Declare a Health Emergency 
 
Q1 Which search term(s) are found in this document? 
 Health Emergenc(ies) (1) 
 Health Disaster(s) (2) 
 
Q2 State 
 Delaware (1) 
 Maryland (2) 
 New Jersey (3) 
 New York (4) 
 
Q3 Is this document a statute or regulation? 
 Statute (1) 
 Regulation (2) 
 Executive Order (3) 
 Other (4) ____________________ 
 
Q4 Document number (e.g., Md. PUBLIC SAFETY Code Ann. § 14-3A-03) 
 
Q5 What is the subject of this document (e.g., § 14-3A-02. Governor's proclamation)?  
 
Q6 Was this law in effect during Hurricane Sandy? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q7 Does this law grant the authority to declare a health emergency/disaster? 
 Yes (If yes, what term is used?) (1) ____________________ 
 No (2) 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Block 
 
Q8 Under this law, by what mechanism is a health emergency/disaster declared (e.g., 
proclamation, executive order, etc.)? 
 
Q9 Under this law, to whom is the authority to declare a health emergency/disaster granted (i.e., 
what officer is granted authority)? 
 Governor (1) 
 Secretary of Health (or equivalent) (5) ____________________ 
 Health Officer (7) 
 Other (4) ____________________ 
 




Q11 Per this law, what MUST declaration address? 
 Description (nature) of health emergency (9) 
 Conditions giving rise to declaration (4) 
 Area(s) affected or threatened by health emergency (18) 
 Effective dates of declaration (1) 
 Geographic areas covered by declaration (3) 
 Agencies responsible for overseeing response (5) 
 Rules or regulations waived or suspended (6) 
 Nothing specified (7) 
 Other (8) ____________________ 
 
Q12 Does this law include requirements for notification regarding or dissemination of a health 
emergency/disaster declaration? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does this law include requirements for notification regarding or dissemination 
of a health emergency/disaster declaration? Yes Is Selected 
Q13 What are the requirements for publicizing or disseminating a health emergency/disaster 
declaration (i.e., to whom must notification be made, through what mechanism, when, etc.)?  
 
Q14 Does state of health emergency/disaster terminate or expire automatically (e.g., yes, it 
automatically terminates after 30 days or no, Governor must revoke declaration)? 
 Yes (1) ____________________ 
 No (2) ____________________ 
 
Q15 What does law say about duration of proclamation? 
 
Q16 Does law specify terms of renewal or extension (i.e., approval required to extend state of 
health emergency)? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does document specify terms of renewal or extension (i.e., approval required 
to extend state of health emergency)? Yes Is Selected 
Q17 What does law say about renewal or extension of a state of health emergency/disaster? 
 
Q18 Does this law address any other responsibilities or authorities (besides declaration)?  
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does this law address any other responsibilities or authorities (besides 
declaration)? Yes Is Selected 
Q19 Describe the additional responsibilities or authorities addressed in this law.  
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Answer If Does this document grant the authority to declare an emergency/disaster? No 
Is Selected 
Q20 Does this document directly relate to the declaration of a health emergency or disaster (e.g., 
definitions, purpose, etc.)? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does this document directly relate to the declaration of a health emergency or 
disaster (e.g., definitions, purpose, etc.)? Yes Is Selected 
Q21 To what does this law pertain? 
 Legislative intent, purpose or policy (1) 
 Definitions (2) 
 Other emergency powers (besides declaration) (3) 
 Other (4) ____________________ 
 
Answer If Does this law grant the authority to declare a health emergency/disaster? No Is 
Selected 
Q22 What does this law address (say)? 
 






Appendix 4 – Data Abstraction Form 3  
 
Authority to Order Evacuation or Shelter-in-Place  
 
Power III Data Abstraction 
 
Q1 Which search term(s) are found in this document? 
 Shelter! (6) 
 Evacuat! (7) 
 
Q2 State 
 Delaware (1) 
 Maryland (2) 
 New Jersey (3) 
 New York (4) 
 
Q3 Is this document a statute or regulation? 
 Statute (1) 
 Regulation (2) 
 Executive Order (3) 
 Other (4) ____________________ 
 
Q4 Document number (e.g., Md. PUBLIC SAFETY Code Ann. § 14-3A-03) 
 
Q5 What is the subject of this document? (e.g., § 14-3A-03. Governor's orders) 
 
Q6 Was law in effect during Hurricane Sandy? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Unknown (3) 
 
Q7 Does this law grant the authority to order evacuation? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To Does this law directly relate to evacuation... 
 
Q8 Under this law, to whom is the authority to order evacuation granted (i.e., what officer is 
granted Power)? 
 Governor (1) 
 Secretary of Health (or equivalent) (2) 
 Other (4) ____________________ 
 
Q9 Does this law specify a threshold that must be met in order to mandate evacuation? Or is there 
a trigger? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
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Answer If Does this law specify a threshold that must be met in order to mandate 
evacuation? Or is there a trigger? Yes Is Selected 
Q10 Per this law, under what conditions can evacuation be ordered (i.e., upon finding...what is 
the threshold/trigger for ordering evacuation)? 
 
Q11 Is approval required to order evacuation? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Is approval required (e.g., is Governor required to seek Legislature approval 
within 30 days)? Yes Is Selected 
Q12 Whose approval is required? 
 Governor (1) 
 Legislature (2) 
 Other (3) ____________________ 
 
Q13 Does the law address the content of the evacuation order (i.e., what should be specified in 
the order)?  
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does the law address the content of the evacuation order (i.e., what should be 
specified in the order)?; Yes Is Selected 
Q14 Per this law, which of the following should be included in the evacuation order? 
 Effective date (when evacuation must begin) (1) 
 Geographic areas to be evacuated (3) 
 Relocation site(s)/Destination (2) 
 Modes of transportation (7) 
 Routes of transportation (10) 
 Other (8) ____________________ 
 
Answer If Does this law grant the authority to order evacuation? No Is Selected 
Q15 Does this law directly relate to evacuation? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Block 
 
Answer If Does this law grant the authority to order evacuation? No Is Selected 
Q16 To what does this law pertain? 
 Legislative intent, purpose, policy (1) 
 Definitions (2) 
 Other (3) ____________________ 
 
Q17 What does this law say about evacuation? (Quote) 
 
Q18 Does this law grant the authority to order shelter-in-place? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To Does this law directly relate to evac... 
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Q19 Under this law, to whom is the authority to order shelter-in-place granted (i.e., what officer 
is granted Power)? 
 Governor (1) 
 Secretary of Health (or equivalent) (2) 
 Other (4) ____________________ 
 
Q20 Does this law specify a threshold that must be met in order to mandate shelter-in-place? Or 
is there a trigger? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does this law specify a threshold that must be met in order to mandate shelter-
in-place? Or is there a trigger? Yes Is Selected 
Q21 Per this law, under what conditions can shelter-in-place be ordered (i.e., upon finding...what 
is the threshold/trigger for ordering shelter-in-place)? 
 
Q22 Is approval required to order shelter-in-place? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Is approval required to order shelter-in-place? Yes Is Selected 
Q23 Whose approval is required? 
 Governor (1) 
 Legislature (2) 
 Other (3) ____________________ 
 
Q24 Does the law address the content of the shelter-in-place order (i.e., what should be specified 
in the order)?  
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does the law address the content of the evacuation order (i.e., what should be 
specified in the order)?; Yes Is Selected 
Q25 Per this law, which of the following should be included in the shelter-in-place order? 
 Effective date (when sheltering-in-place should begin) (1) 
 Geographic areas to shelter-in-place (3) 
 Other (8) ____________________ 
 
Q26 Does this law directly relate to shelter-in-place? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Block 
 
Q27 To what does this law pertain? 
 Legislative intent, purpose, policy (1) 
 Definitions (2) 
 Other (3) ____________________ 
 
Q28 What does this law say about shelter-in-place? 
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Q29 Does this law require the development of emergency plans/procedures addressing evacuation 
and/or sheltering? 
 Yes, evacuation (1) 
 Yes, sheltering (2) 
 Yes, both (3) 
 No (4) 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Block 
 
Answer If Does this law require the development of emergency plans/procedures 
addressing evacuation and/or sheltering? No Is Not Selected 
Q30 What types of hazards does this law say emergency plans should address? 
 Fire (1) 
 Chemical (8) 
 Biological (7) 
 Radiological (4) 
 Nuclear (9) 
 Explosive (2) 
 Natural disaster (3) 
 Other (5) ____________________ 
 Not specified (6) 
 
Q31 To whom does planning requirement apply (i.e., who is required to develop plan)? 
 
Q32 Per this law, to whom would plan apply? 
 
Q33 Does this law require that emergency plans address evacuation routes? 
 Yes (1) ____________________ 
 No (2) 
 
Q34 Does law require plans to address destination(s) or relocation site(s)? 
 Yes (1) ____________________ 
 No (2) 
 
Q35 Does law require plan to comply with any standards (e.g., Joint Commission Standards)? (If 
yes, specify standard) 
 Yes (1) ____________________ 
 No (2) 
 
Q36 Does law specify any other planning requirements? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does law specify any other planning requirements? Yes Is Selected 
Q37 What additional planning requirements does the law provide?  
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Q38 Does this law require exercising or drilling evacuation and/or sheltering in place procedures? 
 Yes, exercising/drilling of evacuation (1) 
 Yes, exercising/drilling of shelter-in-place (2) 
 Yes, both (3) 
 No (4) 
 
Answer If Does this law require exercising or drilling evacuation and/or sheltering in 
place? No Is Not Selected 
Q39 What does the law require in terms of exercising or drilling? 
 
Q40 Does this law require dissemination of or training on plan?  
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Does this law require dissemination of or training on plan?; Yes Is Selected 
Q41 What does this law require with respect to dissemination? training? 
 





Appendix 5 – Template Recruitment Letter 
 
Meghan McGinty, MPH, MBA, CPH 
PhD Candidate 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 
624 N Broadway, Room 509 











Dear [Title. Last Name], 
My name is Meghan McGinty and I am a PhD candidate at the Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health. I am conducting a research project entitled, 
Decision-Making During Disasters: A Case Study of Hurricane Sandy Evacuation/ 
Shelter-in-Place Decision-Making Processes. I am contacting you to ask if you would be 
willing to be interviewed for this study. The purpose of this research study is to 
understand how decisions to evacuate or shelter-in-place hospitals were made during 
Hurricane Sandy. Interview questions will focus on what processes your organization 
used to make decisions about sheltering-in-place or evacuating hospitals; what data, tools, 
or resources informed these decisions; and how you believe such decision processes can 
be improved during future disasters.  
Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary. The interview will last 
approximately one hour, and with your permission it will be audio recorded. The 
interview will be scheduled at a time and location that are convenient for you. You may 
skip any questions or stop the interview at any time. Quotes will not be attributed to you 
or your organization in the written results of the study. Rather, quotes will be attributed to 
the type of organization (e.g., hospital, public health agency, emergency management 
agency, etc.) for which experts such as yourself work. If you are willing to participate or 
have questions about this research study, please contact me by email at 
mmcginty@jhu.edu or by phone at 917-204-4272. Thank you for your time and any 
assistance you may render in the completion of this valuable research project. I look 
forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
Meghan McGinty, MPH, MBA, CPH 
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Decision-Making During Disasters: 





We are currently recruiting hospital executives, emergency managers, and public health 
officials from New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware to be interviewed for a 
research study on hospital evacuation and shelter-in-place decision-making during 
Hurricane Sandy in 2012. If you were responsible for or significantly involved in 
determining whether or not to evacuate or shelter-in-place hospitals, or maintain normal 




The purpose of this research study is to understand how decisions to evacuate or shelter-
in-place hospitals were made during Hurricane Sandy. Interview questions will focus on 
what processes your organization used to make decisions about sheltering-in-place or 
evacuating (internally or externally) hospitals; what data, tools, or resources informed 
these decisions; and any lessons learned. 
 
Logistics 
Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. Interviews will last less than 
one hour, and with permission be audio recorded. Interviews will be scheduled at a time 
and location that are convenient for you. Quotes will not be attributed to you or your 
organization in the written results of the study. 
 
Contact Information 
If you are willing to participate or have questions about this research study, please 
contact Meghan McGinty by email at mmcginty@jhu.edu or by phone at 917-204-4272. 





Appendix 7 - Interview Guide 
 
Decision-Making During Disasters:  




Semi-Structured Interview Protocol for Hospital Representatives 
 
Introduction   
 
This interview is part of a broader exploratory study of hospital evacuation and sheltering 
decisions made during Hurricane Sandy. The interview portion of this project aims to 
understand perspectives of key stakeholders regarding how decisions to either evacuate 
or shelter-in-place hospitals were made during Hurricane Sandy and how such processes 
can be improved in the future to best protect public health and safety. 
 
You have been identified as someone who was responsible for or was a key stakeholder 
significantly involved in evacuation/shelter-in-place decision-making during Hurricane 
Sandy.  
 
This interview is designed to last less than an hour, depending on how the discussion 
goes. You may stop the interview at any time. I will be taking notes and referring to this 
guide in front of me to ensure I don’t miss anything I wanted to ask you. When this 
project is completed, I can provide you with the final abstract and/or a full copy or the 
report. 
 




AUTHORITY and RESPONSIBILITY: I would like to begin with some background 
questions. 
1. In your jurisdiction, who has the authority to evacuate hospitals? 
 Prompt – If informant indicates hospital representative (e.g., CEO) has this 
authority, ask: To your knowledge, are there government officials in your city, 
county, or state who have the authority to order or mandate evacuation or 
sheltering of hospitals? If so, who? 
 Prompt: Can you describe this authority? What does this authority entail? 
 Prompt – If informant indicates non-hospital representative (e.g., governor or 
mayor) has this authority, ask: Within your institution, who has authority to 
decide whether the institution evacuates or shelters-in-place during an 
emergency? 
 
Now I would like to speak specifically about what happened during Hurricane Sandy.  




3. Tell me about [insert name of institution]’s decision to [evacuate/shelter-in-place] 
during Hurricane Sandy? 
 Prompt: If facility evacuated ask: Tell me about the extent of your facility’s 
evacuation. Did you initially evacuate internally – either vertically or 
horizontally?  
 Prompt: Did you evacuate select units or floors in the hospital or did the entire 
hospital evacuate?  
 Prompt – If all patient care units evacuated, ask: Did some individuals (e.g., 
security or environmental services staff) have to shelter-in-place even though 
the facility was evacuated? If so, why did this happen? 
 Prompt: At what point in time relative to Sandy’s landfall, did your institution 
decide to evacuate (e.g., the day before Sandy made landfall, during the storm, 
two days after landfall)? Please tell me about timing of the decision to 
evacuate. 
 Prompt: Do you have previous experience with hurricanes or evacuation? 
4. How did [insert name of institution] determine it should [evacuate/shelter-in-
place]? What processes were used to reach this decision? 
 Prompt: Was there agreement or consensus about the decision to evacuate 
your facility? 
 
INFORMATION AND DECISION-MAKING AIDS 
5. What influenced your decision to [evacuate/shelter-in-place]? 
 What information or data informed the decision to [evacuate/shelter-in-place]?  
 What other factors (cost, politics, social pressure) influenced the decision to 
[evacuate/shelter-in-place]? Who paid for the evacuation? 
6. Did you conduct a risk assessment or decision analysis to determine whether 
[insert institution name] should evacuate or shelter-in-place?  
 Prompt – If informant does not mention guidance, ask: Did you use any 
guidance to help you decide whether or not to evacuate your facility? If 
informant is unsure what you mean by guidance, mention some possible 
guidance documents such as the AHRQ Hospital Evacuation Decision Guide. 
 Prompt – If informant does not mention decision aids, ask: Did you use any 
decision aids or tools to assist in determining whether you should shelter or 
evacuate patients and staff? 
 Prompt – If facility evacuated and informant does not mention the motivation, 
ask: What was the set of circumstances that prompted evacuation? What was 
the ultimate reason for evacuation? 
 Prompt: Did you assess risks to employee safety and health posed by 







LESSONS LEARNED  
 
Now I would like to talk about lessons learned. I would like you to reflect back upon the 
conversation we have had so far about Hurricane Sandy and think about where the 
processes for evacuation/sheltering decision-making could have been improved.  
 
7. Were you satisfied with the hospital evacuation/sheltering-in-place decision 
process? 
 Prompt: What were the implications of evacuating/sheltering-in-place? 
 Prompt: Were there adverse outcomes as a result of evacuation/sheltering-in-
place? Were any workers injured? Were there any patient deaths or adverse 
health outcomes? 
 
8. How do you believe hospital evacuation/sheltering decision-making can be 
improved in the future? 
 Prompt: What additional information would you have wanted to inform your 
decision? 
 Prompt – If institution used existing guidance and informant does not mention 
how it can be improved, ask: How can existing guidance be improved to better 
assist in evacuation decision-making? 
 Prompt – If institution used existing decision-making aids and informant does 
not mention how they can be improved, ask: How can existing decision-
making aids or tools be improved to better assist in evacuation decision-
making? 
 Prompt – If institution did not use existing guidance or decision-making aids, 
ask: What new decision-making guidance, tools, or aids would be helpful in 
evacuation/sheltering decision-making? 
 Prompt: How can decision processes be improved to better protect the safety 
and health of hospital workers during future emergencies? 
 Prompt: What are the three most important things that should be changed or 
done to improve hospital evacuation/sheltering decision-making in the future? 
 
9. How can policies related to hospital evacuation and sheltering be improved? 
 Prompt: Was it clear who had authority to make evacuation and sheltering 
decisions? Are current policies related to evacuation and sheltering sufficient? 
Are current policies effective?  
 Prompt: Thinking specifically about the interaction between the government 




 This conversation has been very helpful. Those are all the questions that I have 
for you today. Is there anything else you would like to tell me? 
 Would you mind if I contacted you again if I have any follow-up questions?  
o If ok to contact informant again, ask: What is the best way to reach you 
for follow-up? 
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 Whom should I talk to in order to learn more?  
o If they identify additional key informants, ask: Do you mind if I let them 
know that you recommended I speak with them? 
 Do you have any questions for me?  
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
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Appendix 8 – Oral Informed Consent Script 
 
 
Oral Informed Consent for Interviewees 
 
PI Name: Thomas Burke, PhD, MPH 
Institution:  Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 
Study Title: Decision-Making During Disasters: A Case Study of Hurricane Sandy Evacuation/ 
Shelter-in-Place Decision-Making Processes 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon. I am a doctoral candidate at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of 
Public Health. I would like to talk with you about a research study on Hurricane Sandy. We are 
working to understand how hospital evacuation and sheltering decisions were made during 
Hurricane Sandy. We ask you to join this study because of your knowledge of these decision 
processes. You do not have to join; it is your choice. You may change your mind at any time. 
 
If you say yes, I will ask you to answer some questions about hospital evacuation and sheltering 
during Hurricane Sandy. The interview will last about one hour. With your permission, I will 
audio record this interview so that it can be transcribed and referred to later when I analyze all of 
the interviews. I may contact you later if I have more questions.  
 
You may be uncomfortable answering questions. You do not have to answer all of the questions. 
You may skip any questions or stop the interview at any time. There is a risk that someone 
outside the study will see your information. We will do our best to keep your information safe by 
storing data on a password-protected computer. Caution will be taken to minimize the risk that 
your identity can be determined. In the written results of this study, quotes will not be attributed 
to you or your organization. Rather, quotes will be attributed to the type of organization (e.g., 
hospital, public health agency, emergency management agency, etc.) for which key informants 
such as yourself work. If I share your information with other researchers, they will use the same 
protections. 
 
You will receive no direct benefit from participating in this study. Indirect benefits include the 
opportunity to contribute your thoughts and expertise on this topic. I will use the information 
from your answers to understand how hospital evacuation and sheltering decision processes can 
be improved in the future to best protect public health. Results of the study will be shared with 
you. You will not be paid to join this study. 
 
Do you have any questions? You may ask me now, or contact the Principal Investigator, Thomas 
Burke, at 410-614-4587. You may also contact the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health Institutional Review Board (IRB), which reviewed this study about any problems or 
concerns at 1-888-262-3242 or irboffice@jhsph.edu. 
 
May I begin? 
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Contact Summary Sheet 
 
Interview #:  
Informant #: 
Date of Interview:  




Type of Organization:   Hospital  
 Public Health 
 Emergency Management 
 Emergency Medical Services 
 
Informant’s Position:   
Today’s Date:  
 
 
1. What were the main issues or themes that struck you in this interview? 
 
 
2. Anything else that struck you as salient, interesting or important in this interview? Were 
there any new hypotheses, speculations, or hunches suggested by the contact? 
 
 
3. What new (or remaining) questions do you have for this jurisdiction (either this county or 
this state)? 
 

























Date: December 23, 2013 
 
To: Meghan McGinty 
 
Re: PhD Dissertation Student Project Title: “Decision-Making During Disasters: A Case 
Study of Hurricane Sandy Evacuation/ Shelt er-in-Place Decision-Making Processes”   
 
 
The JHSPH IRB reviewed the IRB Office Dete rmination Request Form for Primary Data 
Collection (received 12/16/13) on December 20, 2013.  We have determined that the 
proposed activity described in your request form will involve subjects who are key informants 
and collects expert opinions and judgments designed to elicit information from them in their 
professional capacity about hospital evacuat ion and sheltering dur ing Hurricane Sandy.  No 
personal or private information will be collected.  Thus, the proposed activity does not qualify 
as human subjects research as defined by DHHS regulations 45 CFR 46.102, and does not 
require IRB oversight. 
 
You are responsible for notifying the JHSPH IR B of any future changes that might involve 
human subjects and require IRB review.  
 
If you have any questions regarding this determi nation, please contact the JHSPH IRB Office 





cc: Thomas Burke, PhD 
Project Advisor 




JHSPH Institutional Review Board Office
 
615 N. Wolfe Street / Suite E1100 
Baltimore, Maryland  21205  
Office Phone:  (410) 955-3193 
Toll Free:  1-888-262-3242 
Fax Number:  (410) 502-0584              
E-mail Address:  irboffice@jhsph.edu  
Website:  www.jhsph.edu/irb 










Appendix 12 – Thematic Codes 
 




Influential Factors - Motivation for Evacuation or 
Sheltering 
30 557 
  Accreditation standards/Joint Commission 4 5 
  Continuity of care/operations 16 34 
  Cost 15 25 
  Flooding/Storm surge 20 40 
  Location of facility 16 27 
  Mandate/Order 19 38 
  Patient acuity/Hospital type 6 14 
  Politics 16 26 
  Receiving facilities 10 14 
  Risk to patient’s health 24 59 
  Social pressure 7 7 
  Staffing 8 13 
  Storm characteristics/Weather forecast 24 69 
  Structural damage/System failures 23 69 
  Supplies 4 6 
  Transportation/Access 20 50 
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Thematic Code Interviews 
Total 
References 
Authority and responsibility 25 80 
C-Suite engagement 3 5 
Collaboration/Coordination 22 50 
Community expectations/Reliance/Community resource 15 40 
Consensus/Support for decision 20 27 
Decision making process 23 70 
Decisions support resources 17 29 
Defend in place 5 10 
Employee health and safety 16 30 
Evacuation (task/process - not decision) 8 21 
Last resort 6 12 
Left behind 5 10 
Nursing homes/Other healthcare facilities 14 48 
Policy implications 2 4 
Pre-storm preparations and preparedness 25 74 
Prior experience 28 136 
  Irene 24 88 
Risk/vulnerability assessment 21 45 
Satisfaction 23 46 
Social linkages 7 10 
Speed of flooding 1 2 
Timing of evacuation & decision 18 48 
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Thematic Code Interviews 
Total 
References 
Improvements/Lessons Learned 29 271 
  Collaboration and competition 8 12 
  Communication systems and redundancies 11 20 
  Desired info to inform decision 5 12 
  Facility assessments and facility-specific decision- 
making 
5 11 
  Facility construction standards 1 1 
  Funding 3 3 
  Gas 4 6 
  Outcome – mortality/morbidity data 4 5 
  Preparedness planning 13 25 
  Shelter-in-place definition 3 7 
  Transfer process 13 33 
  Transportation/access 3 4 
  Weather/Storm forecasting 14 27 
 
Note: “Interviews” is the number of key informant interviews in which a particular thematic code 
was applied. “Total references” is the total number of times a particular thematic code was 
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